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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
In July 2005, “reformed” hacker Albert Gonzalez noticed an
insecure wireless network at a Marshalls department store in Miami.1
After exploiting the vulnerability, Gonzalez and his accomplices installed
programs that captured credit card numbers.2 They stored the credit card
numbers on servers in Latvia and Ukraine, created ATM cards using some
of the numbers, and used those cards to withdraw hundreds of thousands
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1

Brad Stone, Global Trail of an Online Crime Ring, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/12/technology/12theft.html (reporting
federal indictments against Mr. Gonzalez). After an arrest on credit-card fraud charges in
2003, Gonzalez made a deal to avoid prison time by helping federal agents track down
credit-card traffickers. See id.
2

Id.

1
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of dollars in cash.3 Fifteen months later, Marshalls’ parent company, TJX,
announced that forty-five million of its customers’ credit card numbers
had been exposed to the thieves.4
[2]
Data broker ChoicePoint collects information on nearly every adult
in the United States.5 It gathers and aggregates data anywhere it can find
it, including motor vehicle records, police records, property records, court
records, and credit histories.6 These records include all the details
necessary to set up new credit accounts, such as Social Security numbers,
birth dates, addresses, mothers’ maiden names, and driver’s license
numbers.7 In 2004, ChoicePoint discovered that some clients who had
claimed to be small businesses were actually data thieves.8 A year later,
ChoicePoint admitted to selling hundreds of thousands of records to these
thieves.9 As a result, over 800 people suffered identity fraud.10

3

Id.

4

Id. Gonzalez was arrested in his hotel room in May, 2008. Id. At the time of his arrest,
his hotel room contained two laptops, over $20,000 in cash, and a gun. Id.

5

Gary Rivlin, Keeping Your Enemies Close: The Rehabilitation Of a Data Company,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
12,
2006,
at
B1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/12/business/yourmoney/12choice.html.
ChoicePoint
was spun off from credit reporting agency Equifax in 1997. Id.
6

See id.

7

Id.

8

See Tom Zeller, Jr., Release of Consumers’ Data Spurs ChoicePoint Inquiries, N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
5,
2005,
at
C2,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/05/business/05choice.html.
9

Rivlin, supra note 5.

10

See id.; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security
Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress
(Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm (last visited Sept. 28,
2009).
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[3]
These examples illustrate how data collection can lead to identity
fraud.11 The chain of events begins when an organization collects
sensitive data. At some point, a breach occurs, and the organization loses
control of that data. When a third party obtains and misuses the breached
information, harms result. Identity fraud, often called “identity theft”,12 is
one of the main forms of these harms.13

11

See, e.g., N. MITCHISON ET AL, EUROPEAN COMM’N JOINT RESEARCH CTR. IDENTITY
THEFT:
A
DISCUSSION
PAPER
5
(2004),
https://primeproject.eu/community/furtherreading/studies/IDTheftFIN.pdf.
12

The term “identity theft” is popularly used to describe frauds resulting from misuse of
identifying data. See, e.g., Holly K. Towle, Identity Theft: Myths, Methods, and New
Law, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 237, 241–44 (2004). However, others have
used the term “identity fraud,” and the entire field of research suffers from a lack of
agreement on exactly what “identity theft” is. See, e.g., MITCHISON, supra note 11, at 5;
FIDIS CONSORTIUM ON D5.2B: ID-RELATED CRIME: TOWARDS A COMMON GROUND FOR
INTERDISCIPLINARY
RESEARCH
5,
10–15
(2006),
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp5-del5.2b.ID-related_crime.pdf;
Bob Sullivan, Just How Common is ID Theft?, MSNBC, June 30, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8409283 (last visited Sept. 28, 2009) (noting that surveys
of identity theft disagree on the definition of the term). This note uses the term “identity
fraud,” except when referring to decisions in court cases where the more common term is
used. “Identity theft” is not theft and it does not involve one’s identity. See L. JEAN
CAMP, ECONOMICS OF IDENTITY THEFT: AVOIDANCE, CAUSES AND POSSIBLE CURES 17
(2007). As some commentators have pointed out, an identity is more like intellectual
property than real property in that most “identity theft” cases involve copying identifying
information, not stealing it. See, e.g., FIDIS CONSORTIUM, supra, at 5, 10–15. The word
“identity” is also debatable. Most cases of fraud exploit poor methods of authenticating
identity, not the victim’s actual identity. See id. Many discussions of the topic also
confuse identity with identification. One’s identity is more than just a set of data about
that person. See, e.g., Stacey L. Schreft, Risks of Identity Theft: Can the Market Protect
the Payment System?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., Oct. 2007, at 5, 6,
available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/Publicat/Econrev/PDF/4q07schreft.pdf. To
paraphrase Yoda: luminous beings are we, not this crude data. See GEORGE LUCAS,
LAURENCE KASDAN & LEIGH BRACKETT, STAR WARS EPISODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES
BACK (1980), available at http://www.imsdb.com/scripts/Star-Wars-The-Empire-StrikesBack.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
13

See discussion infra Part V.A.
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[4]
Consumers who find out that their data has been mishandled
respond in a number of ways. Some simply ignore the breach notice.14
Some avail themselves of a free year or two of credit monitoring, a
customary offering by breached organizations.15 Some want more than a
year or two of credit monitoring—and some of those sue the breached
organization for those costs.16
[5]
One theory put forward in these lawsuits is that negligent
organizations should pay for the costs of monitoring to detect or prevent
identity fraud.17 Plaintiffs have analogized these “data monitoring” claims
to the medical monitoring claims in toxic torts.18 Among other
similarities, both claims involve initial exposures that can lead to remote
harms.19 So far, however, courts have rejected this analogy.20
[6]
This article examines the arguments for and against recovery of
data monitoring costs. Part II gives some background on the claims, first
highlighting attempts to recover monitoring costs after data breaches, then
discussing medical monitoring claims and some of the benefits and
problems with these claims. Part III compares data monitoring claims to
medical monitoring claims by examining the analogy and comparing the

14

See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105
MICH. L. REV. 913, 952 (2007) (noting that more than thirty-nine percent of respondents
in a survey said they had mistaken a breach notification letter for junk mail).
15

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA
BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL
EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 35 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 GAO Report] (noting that it has
become “standard practice” for entities that experience a breach to offer free credit
monitoring after a breach).
16

See discussion, infra Part II.A.

17

See id.

18

See id.

19

See id.

20

See id.
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underlying policy arguments for each. Part IV proposes a model for
evaluating non-medical monitoring claims based on whether those costs
were reasonably necessary. Part V then applies this model to data
monitoring costs by examining the costs and probabilities involved, and
shows that these do not currently justify awarding the costs of data
monitoring.
II. BACKGROUND
A. DATA BREACH SUBJECTS’ ATTEMPTS TO RECOVER THE COSTS OF
RESPONDING TO A BREACH
[7]
Because identity fraud may not develop until years after a data
21
breach, data breach victims have used a number of novel theories in
attempting to recover damages for the breaches themselves. Plaintiffs
have sought recovery for increased risk of identity fraud,22 fear of identity
fraud,23 and cost of efforts to reduce their risk of identity fraud.24 These

21

See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1234–38 (2003); Identity Theft: Restoring Your Good Name:
Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and Government
Information, 107th Cong. 12 (2003) (statement of Howard Beales, Director, FTC Bureau
of Consumer Protection) (testifying that five percent of identity theft victims were
unaware of the theft five years after it happened, and that the average time to detect an
identity theft was twelve months).
22

See, e.g., Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Shafran v.
Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 01365(GBD), 2008 WL 763177, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 20, 2008); Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.C.
2007); Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 2d 793, 796 (M.D. La. 2007); Key v. DSW,
Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 2006).

23

See, e.g., Melancon v. La. Office of Student Fin. Assistance, 567 F. Supp. 2d 873, 874
(E.D. La. 2008); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp., 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007);
Ponder, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 796.

24

See, e.g., Pinero v. Jackson-Hewitt Tax Serv., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 710, 714 (E.D. La.
2009); Shafran, 2008 WL 763177, at *1; Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632; Stollenwerk v. TriWest Health Care Alliance, 254 Fed.Appx. 664, 665 (9th Cir. 2007); Randolph, 486 F.
Supp. 2d at 4; Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (S.D. Ohio
2007); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020 (D. Minn. 2006);

5
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claims mimic, respectively, the toxic tort theories of enhanced risk, fear of
future harm, and medical monitoring.25 Although these theories have
gained some acceptance in the context of physical harms,26 they have
proven much less helpful for data breach plaintiffs. Few of these claims
have survived summary judgment or motions to dismiss.27
[8]
Courts have rejected these claims for a number of reasons. Many
found the harm too speculative to confer standing, especially when
plaintiffs claimed increased risk or emotional harms.28 Even when
plaintiffs have sought the cost of measures to avoid identity fraud, courts
typically have found these efforts not to be harms themselves, but merely
voluntary actions taken in anticipation of potential future harm.29 Some

Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., Inc., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL
288483, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006); Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476
(JBS), 2006 WL 2177036, at *2 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006); Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 686.
25

See generally L. NEAL ELLIS, JR. & CHARLES D. CASE, TOXIC TORT AND HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCE LITIGATION §§ 6-1 to 6-4 (1995).
26

See discussion infra Part II.B.

27

See, e.g., Pinero, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 718–19 (granting summary judgment to defendant
for contract claims including expenses for credit monitoring); Kahle, 486 F. Supp. 2d at
709–13 (granting summary judgment to defendant where plaintiff argued for the cost of
credit monitoring as a harm); Giordano, 2006 WL 2177036, at *5 (remanding to state
court for lack of standing, where plaintiff’s only claimed harm was the cost of money
spent to prevent identity fraud); Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (dismissing a claim seeking
recovery for the increased risk of identity fraud). But see Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d
433, 438 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a plaintiff who alleged identity fraud had standing
to sue for the cost of credit monitoring); Ruiz, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (holding that a
pre-trial motion to dismiss was too early a stage to dismiss a claim for increased risk of
identity fraud because such a risk could be proven as part of the plaintiff’s case).
28

See, e.g., Ponder, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 796–98; Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 8–9;
Forbes, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1020–21; Guin, 2006 WL 288483 at *3–6.

29

See Ponder, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 796–98; Randolph, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 8; Forbes, 420 F.
Supp. 2d at 1020–21.

6

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

courts have done little more than survey other states’ positions on credit
monitoring as a compensable injury.30
[9]
But a handful of courts have considered, at least briefly, the
similarity between claims for medical monitoring and claims for credit
monitoring. In Giordano v. Wachovia Securities, L.L.C.,31 the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey became the first court to
consider the analogy, deeming it “inapt.”32 Just over a month later, in Key
v. DSW, Inc.,33 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
followed suit. Two other federal courts have noted the analogy when
rejecting claims.34
[10] The most extensive judicial analysis of the analogy to date appears
in a case by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Stollenwerk v.
Tri-West Health Care Alliance.35 The Stollenwerk court denied a claim for
credit monitoring damages to plaintiffs whose data was on a computer
stolen from Tri-West because the plaintiffs had not shown that the
breached information was misused in any way.36 The court held that even
30

See Pinero, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 715–17; Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
01365(GBD), 2008 WL 763177, at *1–3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2008).

31

No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006).

32

Id. at *3 n.4. The court rejected the analogy because it found that the plaintiff’s
allegation of potential identity fraud resulting from data loss was merely an allegation of
potential exposure, not an allegation of actual exposure required for a medical
monitoring claim. Id.
33

454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 691 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (finding a lack of exposure because
plaintiff did not allege that her data had been misused).
34

See Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bank Corp., 499 F.3d 629, 639 (7th Cir. 2007); Hendricks v.
DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (W.D. Mich. 2006). The courts in
both these cases were applying state law in states that did not recognize claims for
medical monitoring, and thus found it unlikely that the states would have recognized
claims for non-medical monitoring costs. See id.; Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 639.

35

254 Fed. Appx. 664 (9th Cir. 2007).

36

Id. at 666–67.

7
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if credit monitoring damages were available under the same standard as
medical monitoring claims, the plaintiffs had failed to meet that standard
because they did not show that the relief sought was necessary.37 The
court also discussed one of the underlying justifications for medical
monitoring damages: “to ensure that the cost of testing does not prevent
plaintiffs from receiving increased medical surveillance that is of actual
benefit to them.”38 The court rejected the claims because the plaintiffs had
not shown that “a normally prudent person in these circumstances” would
have purchased credit monitoring services beyond those that Tri-West
offered for free.39
[11] Other than Stollenwerk, courts considering the parallel between
identity monitoring claims and medical monitoring damages have focused
primarily on the analogy, with particular attention to the issue of
exposure.40 But this analysis skips a step. The question should not be
merely whether data breach is or is not like toxic exposure. The inquiry
should instead be based on an evaluation of the arguments for and against
medical monitoring damages and their applicability in the data breach
context.
B. MEDICAL MONITORING
1. OVERVIEW
[12] Medical monitoring damages allow recovery of the costs of
medical tests designed to detect and prevent the onset of diseases resulting

37

Id.

38

Id. at 667.

39

Id.

40

See, e.g., Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *3
n.4 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006); Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690–91 (S.D. Ohio
2006).
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from the a defendant’s actions.41 Plaintiffs have sought damages for the
cost of monitoring the long-term effects of physical injuries,42
pharmaceuticals,43 tobacco,44 insecticides,45 asbestos,46 and other harmful
substances.47 Although standards for medical monitoring damages vary
across jurisdictions, a few common elements have emerged. Recovery of
medical monitoring costs requires proof that (1) the plaintiff was exposed
to a toxic substance,48 (2) the exposure resulted from the defendant’s
negligence,49 (3) the exposure increased50 the plaintiff’s risk of serious

41

See Richard Bourne, Medical Monitoring Without Physical Injury: The Least Justice
Can Do for Those Industry Has Terrorized with Poisonous Products, 58 SMU L. REV.
251, 252 (2005).
42

See, e.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 818–
19 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
43

See, e.g., Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).

44

See, e.g., Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 182 (Or. 2008).

45

See, e.g., Villari v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 727, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1987).

46

See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(allowing damages for procedures to detect and treat diseases arising from asbestos
exposure).
47

See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 835 (3d Cir. 1990) (polychlorinated biphenyls); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 800 (Cal.
1993) (carcinogenic toxic waste); Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 292 (N.J.
1987) (various toxic chemicals).
48

Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 979 (Utah 1993). Some
jurisdictions use a higher standard that requires proof of significant exposure. See, e.g.,
Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852; Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 432 (W. Va.
1999).
49

See, e.g., Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852 (listing “negligent actions of the defendant” as a
component of the court’s medical monitoring test); Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 (including
“exposure . . . caused by the defendant’s negligence” in the elements of a valid medical
monitoring claim); Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 432 (allowing medical monitoring for exposure
that results from the defendant’s “tortious conduct”).
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disease or illness,51 (4) there exist beneficial medical procedures to treat
that disease or illness,52 and (5) those procedures are reasonably
necessary.53
[13] One of the biggest differences in the approaches to medical
monitoring claims is whether recovery depends on the plaintiff having a
present physical injury. States with a present-physical-injury requirement
allow recovery for medical monitoring only when the plaintiff has

50

Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979. Some jurisdictions phrase their tests as requiring a
“significant” increase. See, e.g., Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852; Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 432. This
stronger language does not appear to make a substantive difference. See Bower, 522
S.E.2d at 432 (holding a “significant” increase in risk does not have to be more probable
than not, only higher than the risk without exposure).
51

Jurisdictions agree that the disease or illness for which the plaintiff is at risk must be
serious. See, e.g., Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 (phrasing this element as requiring a serious
risk of disease, illness, or injury); Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 432.
52

The requirement that the medical procedures be beneficial takes several forms.
Compare Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852 (requiring the monitoring and testing procedures simply
be “beneficial”), with Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979 (holding that early detection is beneficial
if a treatment can alter the course of an illness), and Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (having no
explicit requirement that the procedure be beneficial, but instead relying on the
reasonable necessity element to serve the same function).

53

Courts have also stated the reasonable necessity requirement in different ways. Some
simply say that the medical procedures must be reasonably necessary. Compare Paoli,
916 F.2d at 852 (requiring medical examinations to be only reasonably necessary), and
Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (holding that medical
surveillance must merely be “reasonable and necessary”), with Hansen, 858 P.2d at 979
(requiring that monitoring be prescribed by a qualified physician according to
contemporary scientific principles), and Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (explaining that a
medical procedure is reasonably necessary if a qualified physician would prescribe that
procedure). Jurisdictions also differ on whether cost should factor into the analysis.
Compare Bower, 522 S.E.2d at 433 (holding that “factors such as financial cost and the
frequency of testing need not necessarily be given significant weight” in determining
whether a procedure is reasonably necessary) with Hansen, 858 P.2d at 980 (noting that a
procedure’s costs might outweigh its benefits because “excessive price,” among other
reasons).

10
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manifested some physical harm.54 Of the twenty-nine states that recognize
medical monitoring claims,55 sixteen allow recovery only when the
plaintiff has shown a present physical injury.56
2. BENEFITS
[14] Many of the benefits of allowing medical monitoring claims arise
from public health interests. Recognition of medical monitoring claims
reflects the widely accepted value of early diagnosis and treatment in
preventing disease,57 and that money alone cannot fully compensate a
victim for loss of health.58 These public health benefits are some of the
most commonly cited reasons for allowing medical monitoring claims.59

54

In some but not all states, the requirement is for a present physical injury—not only
must there be a demonstrable physical condition traceable to the exposure, but that
condition must be harmful. See, e.g., Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d
1355, 1361–62 (N.D. Ga. 2006). Other states, however, allow medical monitoring when
there is a physical condition proving exposure, even if that condition is not strictly a
disease or injury. See id. (listing several jurisdictions that do and do not consider
asymptomatic pleural thickening to be an “injury” sufficient to allow recovery of medical
monitoring costs).
55

See D. Scott Aberson, Note, A Fifty-State Survey of Medical Monitoring and the
Approach the Minnesota Supreme Court Should Take when Confronted with the Issue, 32
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1095, 1114–17 (2006). As of 2006, twenty-nine states plus the
District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands allowed medical monitoring claims.
See id. Since then, Mississippi and Oregon have both considered and rejected claims for
medical monitoring without present physical injuries. See Paz v. Brush Eng’red
Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 7 ¶ 20 (Miss. 2007); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183
P.3d 181, 186–87 (Or. 2008).

56

Aberson, supra note 55, at 1114.

57

See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311–12.

58

See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1576 (1997).
59

See, e.g., Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 33–34 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(quoting Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795,
824 (Cal. 1993); Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 660 (Ct. App. 1993);

11
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[15] Recovery for medical monitoring costs also improves deterrence.60
Exposure can take decades to develop into disease61—too far in the future
for potential liability to be a factor when business decisions are often
based on short-term profits.62 By the time the disease develops, the
company responsible for the release of toxins might not even be in
business.63 Not only could payments for medical procedures could happen
early enough to figure into business calculations, but the shorter time
frame for medical monitoring claims also allows the plaintiff a better
chance to prove causation than she would have when the disease is
diagnosed years or decades after exposure.64
[16] Medical monitoring recovery has been justified on other grounds.
One consideration is simple equity: when a victim has been exposed to
toxins as a result of a wrongdoer’s negligence, the wrongdoer, not the
victim, should shoulder the cost of reasonably necessary medical

Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 976–77 (Utah 1993) (quoting Ayers,
525 A.2d at 311).
60

Potter, 863 P.2d at 824.

61

See Miranda, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 659–60 (discussing claims that might be precluded when
“disease actually develops, years, perhaps decades” into the future); Greenville v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that asbestos-related diseases
“may not develop until decades after exposure”); BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS:
MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 91 (1984) (discussing a 1960 study that found that “[t]he
average time from onset of exposure to development of cancer was 25 years for lung
cancer with asbestosis, and 30 years for peritoneal cancer.”).
62

M. P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469, 1469
(1985).
63

See Thomas J. Salerno et al., Environmental Law and Its Impact on Bankruptcy Law—
Saga of “Toxins-R-Us”, 25 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 261, 263 (1990); Anthony G.
Hopp, Bad Medicine: The Legal, Policy and Medical Arguments Against Medical
Monitoring, 23 BNA TOXICS L. REP. 436, 436–40 (2008).
64

Ayers, 525 A.2d at 311–12. This deterrence function also has a secondary health
benefit: deterring release and use of toxins reduces the number of infections and thus
overall public health. See id. at 312.
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procedures.65 Another consideration is cost: many diseases that result
from toxic exposure are expensive to treat; procedures for early detection
can save money.66
[17] The doctrine of avoidable consequences provides another costrelated justification. 67 Somewhat incorrectly referred to as a “duty to
mitigate,” 68 the doctrine prevents a plaintiff from recovering damages she
could have avoided with reasonable effort.69 A toxic tort plaintiff would
therefore be unable to recover any amount that was avoidable through
reasonably necessary detection and prevention procedures.70 Allowing the
plaintiff to recover the costs of those procedures recognizes that she is
expected to do so.71

65

See id. at 311.

66

See id. at 312; Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993).
But see discussion infra note 90.
67

See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 310–11 (noting that under the doctrine of avoidable
consequences, failure to submit to medically advisable treatment “may bar future
recovery for a condition he could thereby have alleviated or avoided.”); see also
discussion infra Part IV.B.
68

The doctrine of avoidable consequences is a defense allowing reduction of damages; it
does not create a duty on the part of the plaintiff to the defendant. See Jeffrey K. Riffer
& Elizabeth Barrowman, Recent Misinterpretations of the Avoidable Consequences Rule:
The “Duty” To Mitigate and Other Fictions, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 415–17
(1993).
69

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918(1) (1979); see also JACOB A. STEIN,
STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 18:1 (3d ed. 2009).
70

Ayers, 525 A.2d at 310–11. Note, however, that courts do not always require plaintiffs
to submit to medical procedures to mitigate damages. See STEIN, supra note 69 § 18:4.

71

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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3. PROBLEMS
[18] Despite these benefits, medical monitoring claims have several
problems. Some of the problems stem from the uncertainty inherent in a
claim based on monitoring for future harm.72 In most cases, a toxic
exposure only increases the risk of a future harm; it neither guarantees
harm nor necessarily creates a significant probability of harm.73 Some
courts, therefore, find the costs of monitoring to be too speculative to
convey standing or count as a compensable injury.74 Courts that allow
medical monitoring claims—especially those that allow claims without a
showing of present physical injury—reason that the relevant injury is the
need for monitoring itself, provided that the plaintiff can show that such
monitoring is medically prudent.75

72

Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997).

73

See, e.g., Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Ky. 2002) (noting that
the plaintiff’s exposure had the “potential to result in serious future medical
consequences” but had not yet done so).
74

See, e.g., id. at 856 (holding that allowing medical monitoring absent a showing of
present physical injury would enable litigation based on “speculative fears of future
injury”); Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 830 (Ala. 2001) (holding that “a cause
of action based upon nothing more than an increased risk that an injury or an illness
might one day occur would result in the courts of this State deciding cases based upon
nothing more than speculation and conjecture”).
75

See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that “
the appropriate inquiry is not whether it is reasonably probable that plaintiffs will suffer
harm in the future, but rather whether medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease.”);
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993) (emphasizing that
“allowing compensation for medical monitoring costs ‘does not require courts to
speculate about the probability of future injury. It merely requires courts to ascertain the
probability that the far less costly remedy of medical supervision is appropriate.’”); Ayers
v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987) (holding that medical monitoring
damages are available “provided that plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that such expenditures are ‘reasonably anticipated’ to be incurred by
reason of their exposure”); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 430 (W.
Va. 1999).
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[19] Similarly, the indeterminate nature of exposure to toxins raises
serious concerns about the number of potential plaintiffs in a medical
monitoring case.76 For example, when a polluter releases toxins into the
environment or when a widely traveled area contains asbestos, it is
difficult to draw lines between who has been “exposed” and who has not.77
Critics of medical monitoring point out that nearly everyone is exposed to
toxins,78 and argue that allowing recovery of medical monitoring costs for
mere exposure would create a flood of lawsuits that could crush the legal
system.79 A flood of relatively minor cases would also prevent the courts
from devoting their limited resources to the most worthy claims.80
[20] The present-physical-injury requirement addresses some of these
concerns. An existing physical injury shows the harm necessary for

76

See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442.

77

See id. (expressing concern that “tens of millions of individuals may have suffered
exposure to substances that might justify some form of substance-exposure-related
medical monitoring”).

78

See id. at 434–35 (listing statistics showing extensive public exposure to carcinogens);
see also Susan L. Martin & Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions for Medical Monitoring:
Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 130 (1995) (“in the very near
future we may all have reasonable grounds to allege that some negligent business
exposed us to hazardous substances.”); Hopp, supra note 63, at 439 (“[i]f negligently
exposing someone to a hazardous substance gives rise to a legal claim, then every person
in the United States would daily have a long list of potential lawsuits to choose from.”).
79

Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442. See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental
Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815, 845 (2002) (“[a]nother
inescapable implication of the inherent vagueness and open-endedness of medical
monitoring litigation is that the courts will face, in the long run, an overwhelming flood
of litigation in this area.”).
80

Buckley, 521 U.S. at 443–44 (expressing concern that a medical monitoring cause of
action would degrade “a tort system that can distinguish between reliable and serious
claims on the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial claims on the other.”).
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standing and negligence. 81 It also limits the potential class of plaintiffs to
those who have manifested physical symptoms, eliminating would-be
plaintiffs who can only allege proximity to a toxin, not infection.82
[21] Another problem with medical monitoring claims is the potential
risk inherent in medical monitoring procedures. Many of these procedures
are invasive and carry health risks that must be weighed against the
procedures’ potential benefits.83 In addition to the risks from the
procedures themselves, there are risks that patients may take false
reassurance from the monitoring, or that false positives could lead to
unnecessary, costly, or dangerous follow-up procedures.84 A related
question is whether a toxic exposure really makes monitoring procedures
more necessary than they would have been otherwise. Some level of
monitoring is prudent even without any exposure to a toxin;85 it would be
inequitable to require a defendant to pay for medical procedures the
plaintiff should have received regardless of exposure. Juries and judges,
therefore, face the difficult task of determining the amount of monitoring
needed as a result of the defendant’s actions over and above the normally
prudent level.86

81

See, e.g., Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 832 (Ala. 2001); Wood v. WyethAyerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002); Paz v. Brush Eng’red Materials, Inc., 949
So. 2d 1, 9 ¶ 25(Miss. 2007); Aberson, supra note 55, at 1114.

82

See Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Mich. 2005) (explaining that the
physical injury requirement “defines more clearly who actually possesses a cause of
action”).

83

See Victor E. Schwartz, Leah Lorber & Emily J. Laird, Medical Monitoring: The Right
Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 356–57 (2005) (discussing the risks of
monitoring procedures).
84

Id.

85

See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 441–42 (citing expert testimony that the American Cancer
Society recommends periodic colon cancer screening for everyone).
86

See id. (noting the difficulty in getting experts to agree on whether extra monitoring is
medically necessary as the result of toxic exposure).
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[22] Courts have addressed these risk and necessity questions by
relying on expert medical opinions.87 The medical opinions should take
risk factors into account.88 In theory, a doctor would only prescribe testing
procedures when the benefits of those procedures outweigh their risks.
Expert medical testimony can also help establish how much monitoring is
necessary as a direct result of the alleged exposure.89
[23] Other criticisms of medical monitoring claims involve cost factors.
Because medical tests can be expensive, courts have expressed concern
that these procedures could be much more expensive than the illnesses the
procedures are meant to detect.90 Making defendants pay for the costs of
medical tests also ignores alternative forms of payment for these
procedures, such as insurance.91 Some courts and commentators worry
87

In some jurisdictions, this is satisfied if tests are found to be “reasonably necessary,”
defined as procedures that a qualified physician would prescribe. See Bower v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 433 (W. Va. 1999). Others jurisdictions
require the actual prescription of the monitoring procedures. See, e.g., Hansen v.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 980 (Utah 1993). Hansen’s prescription
requirement ensures that a medical procedure not only exists and is theoretically
beneficial, but that a doctor has determined that the procedure is “medically advisable for
that plaintiff.” Id.
88

The medical necessity of a procedure may or may not involve its monetary cost,
depending on jurisdiction. See discussion supra note 53.

89

See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987).

90

See, e.g., Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442. In Buckley, the United States Supreme Court noted
that the plaintiff sought $950 per year in damages for thirty-six years, but that the average
settlement for asbestos injury claims over a six- year period was $12,500. Id. Although
this may or may not be an accurate cost comparison (Were the damages Buckley sought
truly representative of the diagnostic costs? Were settlements by the Center for Claims
Resolution representative, or did they omit high-value claims that went to court?), it
shows that it is far from certain that monitoring costs will always be less expensive than
the expected cost of disease, at least in purely monetary terms.
91

See id. at 442–43. Whether toxic tort defendants or insurers are in a better position to
bear the costs of medical tests is far beyond the scope of this note, but it is worth noting
that—assuming the tests are medically necessary and will happen either way—the cost of
those tests is a given, and from a societal standpoint someone will have to pay the cost of
those tests. The only question is who: the victim, the wrongdoer, or an insurer?
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about the potentially devastating financial impact medical monitoring
cases could have on defendants.92 It can also be hard to decide how to
structure payment of medical monitoring damages; the successful plaintiff
might not spend a lump sum payment on medical procedures, but an
award of regular payments would require burdensome judicial
supervision.93
[24] Finally, medical monitoring damages raise claim preclusion
issues.94 Claim preclusion prevents a plaintiff from suing a defendant
twice over the same transaction or occurrence.95 This is a problem when
medical monitoring costs have been awarded, because a later suit for the
disease would be based on the same occurrence as the medical monitoring
suit.96 A strict interpretation of claim preclusion would bar the second
suit,97 forcing the potential plaintiff to choose between compensation for
preventive monitoring or compensation for the disease should it develop.98
92

See, e.g., Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 857 (Ky. 2002) (noting that
requiring defendants to pay large medical monitoring judgments would impair their
“ability to fully compensate victims who emerge years later with actual injuries that
require immediate attention.”); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 79, at 844; Hopp, supra
note 63, at 439.
93

See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 440–41 (noting the different ways medical monitoring
payouts have been handled by courts, and discussing policy concerns about lump-sum
payments).

94

See Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858–59; see also Tamara Jeanne Dodge, Raging Hormones?:
The Legal Obstacles and Policy Ramifications to Allowing Medical Monitoring Remedies
in Hormone Replacement Therapy Suits, 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 287–88 (2006).

95

Wood, 82 S.W.3d at 858.

96

See Dodge, supra note 94, at 287.

97

See Wood 82 S.W.3d at 858–59; Christine H. Kim, Note, Piercing the Veil of Toxic
Ignorance: Judicial Creation of Scientific Research, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 540, 573–74
(2007).

98

See, e.g., Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659–60 (Ct. App. 1993)
(allowing medical monitoring costs but refusing to treat them as a distinct cause of action
and discussing the potential problem this could create for the plaintiff if disease actually
were to develop). The decision would be particularly hard because a toxic tort victim
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Some courts, finding this forced choice to be inequitable, have endorsed
claim- splitting in medical monitoring cases.99 Because many states have
rejected medical monitoring damages altogether and not all states that
allow such claims have had to face the issue, claim preclusion in medical
monitoring cases remains largely an unsettled question.100
[25] These concerns show why a large number of states have rejected
medical monitoring as a cause of action, and why many of those that
recognize medical monitoring claims either require present physical
symptoms or view medical monitoring costs solely as a measure of
damages.101 Analysis of medical monitoring claims requires balancing
conflicting policy benefits and costs; thus, it is an area in which courts are
split.

could be medically better off getting preventive medical procedures but financially better
off with compensation for the disease. Id. at 660.
99

See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 300 (N.J. 1987); Eagle-Picher Indus. v.
Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
100

See, e.g., Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding that
under Pennsylvania law a claim for medical monitoring damages would not
“theoretically” preclude a later claim should a disease develop); Pankaj Venugopal, The
Class Certification of Medical Monitoring Claims, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1659, 1674–78
(2002) (discussing claim preclusion for medical monitoring claims, and noting that “the
case law is sparse,” but speculating that courts that allow medical monitoring without
present physical injury would probably allow later claims for physical injuries). Some
authors cite this uncertainty as reason to reject medical monitoring damages altogether.
See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 94, at 288 (arguing that a court’s position on the claim
preclusion question is unforeseeable until it has met the issue, and thus it is poor policy to
allow medical monitoring damages knowing that a claim for later injury might be
precluded).
101

See Dodge, supra note 94, at 287.
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III. COMPARING MEDICAL MONITORING CLAIMS TO
CLAIMS RESULTING FROM DATA LOSS
A. EXAMINING THE ANALOGY
[26] Data loss shares a number of features with toxic torts. Both
involve claims resulting from exposure that may, over time, develop into
serious and costly harms.102 Whether the plaintiff is exposed to toxins or
her data is exposed to others, the future harm of the exposure is expected
to be much worse than any current harm.103 In both cases, causation can
be difficult to prove because of distance in time between the exposure and
harm, and because there are multiple possible causes.104 Physical harm is
not a factor in data loss cases and is not always present in medical
monitoring cases.105 With both toxins and data loss, procedures may exist
that can detect or mitigate the progress of the future harm.106
[27] Despite these similarities, several differences exist. The most
obvious difference is that toxic tort claims involve physical injury, but
data loss claims do not.107 Even in toxic tort cases without present

102

See Vincent R. Johnson, Data Security and Tort Liability, 11 No. 7 J. INTERNET L. 22,
29–30 (2008).

103

See generally Ayers, 525 A.2d 287.

104

See id. at 301 (discussing the difficulty of proving causation in toxic tort cases); Erin
Dowe, Frustration Station: Attempting to Control Your Credit, 16 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 359, 362–63 (2006) (noting that the remoteness of identity fraud makes
perpetrators hard to catch); see also discussion supra notes 21, 61.
105

See, e.g., Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Ky. 2002) (rejecting a
medical monitoring claim from a plaintiff who alleged exposure to a drug but no physical
harm); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312–13 (allowing medical monitoring damages to plaintiffs
who were exposed to water contaminated by the defendant, but who had not yet
developed physical symptoms).
106

See Johnson, supra note 102, at 29.

107

See id.
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physical injury, any future harm is medical.108 Despite the stress resulting
from identity fraud,109 harms from data loss are almost entirely
economic.110 Because of the important governmental interest in public
health and the irreversible nature of many illnesses, courts give medical
harms greater consideration than harms that can be fully repaid with
money.111
[28] Some differences involve the way future harms develop. For
example, the time frames are different: although compromised data may
not be misused for years, toxins can take decades to develop into
disease.112 And the reasons for the delayed harm are also different. Toxins
take time to develop into disease because they affect the body gradually.113
But the time between data loss and data misuse is mere delay. Harm from

108

See id.

109

See Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, 486 F.Supp. 2d 705, 712 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(noting “findings that identity theft results in more than purely pecuniary damages,
including psychological or emotional distress”).
110

But see PAM DIXON, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT: THE
INFORMATION
CRIME
THAT
CAN
KILL
YOU
5
(2006),
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/wpf_medicalidtheft2006.pdf. (discussing an
exception to this general rule: medical identity fraud, where an imposter uses another’s
identifying information to get medical care). This form of fraud can be life threatening
when bad information in a victim’s medical records results in incorrect treatments. Id. at
6.
111

See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987).

112

See Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that
asbestos-related diseases “may not develop until decades after exposure”); Miranda v.
Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659–60 (Ct. App. 1993) (discussing claims that might
be precluded when “disease actually develops, years, perhaps decades” into the future);
CASTLEMAN, supra note 61, at 91.

113

Miranda, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d at 659. Indeed, some time delay is usually necessary for a
toxic exposure to turn into a disease. Compromised data can be sued as soon as it is
obtained, and some forms of data (such as credit card numbers) are more useful to the
thief immediately after being stolen. See id.
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data loss also requires an intervening third-party action.114 The data alone
does no harm until a third party uses it, but toxins produce disease on their
own.115
[29] There is also a difference in general acceptance of the different
remedial measures. Doctors, patients, and courts all recognize the
importance of early diagnosis and treatment of diseases like cancer.116 The
usefulness of data-loss response measures is far less certain.117 Medical
tests are also individually prescribed by doctors according to their
patients’ particular needs. Credit monitoring, however, is a standardized
product selected by the consumer without any professional evaluation of
its usefulness.118
[30] The nature of exposure is also different. In toxic tort cases, a
substance is released into the air or water, or is present in an environment
where people are exposed to it.119 Any number of people could potentially
find themselves exposed at varying levels.120 Data loss, however, is

114

See Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F.Supp. 2d 684, 691 (S.D. Ohio 2006). There is an
exception to this general rule: a data compromise that makes the data public may create
privacy issues. Cf. id. Imagine, for example, that a photo processing company
accidentally posts someone’s explicit pictures on the Internet. In that case, no action of a
third party was required to create a harm. But privacy claims for data loss are different
from the negligence claims contemplated by monitoring claims, and fall outside the scope
of this note.
115

Cf. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 299–300.

116

See id. at 311.

117

See discussion infra Part V.A.

118

See, e.g., How is LifeLock Different From a Credit Monitoring System?,
http://www.lifelock.com/lifelock-for-people/how-we-do-it/how-is-lifelock-differentfrom-a-credit-monitoring-system (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
119

See, e.g., D. Alan Rudlin & Christopher R. Graham, Toxic Torts: A Primer, 17 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T 210, 210 (2003).
120

See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442 (1997).
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comparatively well-defined and binary. Either a person’s data is among a
set of lost records or it is not.121
[31] Although it does not pose the same line-drawing problem inherent
in exposure to toxins, data loss has a similar problem: it is unknown
whether compromised data will actually be misused. Thus, some courts
have imported the “exposure” question into data loss cases by requiring
plaintiffs to show that their data was either (a) acquired or (b) misused by
a third party, as opposed to merely lost.122 This requirement is a little like
the present-physical-injury element some courts require for medical
monitoring recovery123 and serves a similar purpose of rejecting plaintiffs
whose injuries are too speculative.124
[32] The analogy is flawed. But do those flaws weigh in favor of
accepting data loss monitoring, or against it? Factors are mixed. While
data loss claims obviously lack the compelling public health justification,
they are less prone to the exposure questions and infinite classes of
plaintiffs in medical monitoring claims. The analogy alone is not enough
to justify allowing or denying data loss monitoring claims. A full analysis

121

If the data collector does not know which records were compromised, it should know
what records it had, or at least all the possible records it had.
122

See, e.g., Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care Alliance, 254 Fed. Appx. 664, 666 (9th
Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim for credit monitoring, arising out of stolen computer
equipment, where the plaintiffs “offered no evidence the thieves had any interest in their
personal information, rather than just the hardware.”); Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, 420
F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D. Minn. 2006) (rejecting a credit monitoring claim because the
plaintiffs had not shown that their data was accessed); Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv.
Corp., No. Civ. 05-668 RHK/JSM, 2006 WL 288483, at *6 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006)
(rejecting a claim where the plaintiff “failed to present evidence that his personal data
was targeted or accessed” by the people who stole a laptop with the plaintiff’s data).
123

See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.

124

See Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *4 (D.
N.J. July 31, 2006) (holding that the injuries plaintiff claimed were “speculative and
hypothetical” because she could not show that data lost in the mail had actually been
misused).
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must look beyond the analogy and consider the policies behind these
claims.
B. MOVING BEYOND THE ANALOGY: POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND
AGAINST DATA LOSS CLAIMS
[33] Part II.B discussed medical monitoring claims’ benefits and
problems. The primary justifications for granting medical monitoring
claims are interests in public health, deterrence, equity, and cost savings.125
These claims, however, also suffer a number of problems, including the
uncertainty of future harm, the difficulty in determining when there has
been “exposure” absent present physical injury, potential health risks of
monitoring procedures, the difficulty of determining how much an
exposure has increased any need for prudent medical testing, the costs of
monitoring compared to the disease, the cost burden on the defendant, and
claim preclusion issues.126
[34] Not all of the benefits and problems associated with medical
monitoring apply in data loss situations. Most notably, data loss claims
lack a public health benefit.127 But data loss claims also lack any public
health danger because data monitoring, unlike many medical monitoring
procedures, poses no health risk.128 The lack of a public health danger is
significant. In some jurisdictions, the lack of physical harm, whether
immediate or occurring in the future, precludes inquiry into recovery for
mitigation measures.129 As a consequence, jurisdictions that refuse to
entertain “novel” tort theories and insist that negligence is available only

125

See discussion supra Part II.B.2.

126

See discussion supra Part II.B.3.

127

See Jennifer A. Chandler, Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security, 23
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 223, 240–41 (2008).

128

See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text.

129

See discussion supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes.
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for injury to persons or property are unlikely to look past traditional tort
principles in consideration of other justifications for data monitoring.130
[35] But there are other justifications for data monitoring claims.
Remedial measures that allow data loss victims to mitigate the future cost,
hassle, waste of time, and stress of responding to the misuse of data should
be available if cost-effective.131 Allowing plaintiffs to recover damages for
reasonably necessary remedial measures would deter mishandling of data
and require that the party responsible for losing the data pay the cost of
those measures.132 The justifications of deterrence, equity, and cost apply
as much to data loss as they do in cases of physical harm.133 The
avoidable-consequences justifications may be even stronger in nonmedical cases because the remedial measures do not require the plaintiff to
submit to potentially dangerous medical procedures.134
[36] Many of the problems with medical monitoring also apply to data
loss. These problems often involve determining when remedial measures
are reasonably necessary.135 The factors used in determining whether

130

See generally Chandler, supra note 127, at 235–45 (discussing the difficulties
plaintiffs face in showing actual harm and causation).

131

See id. at 229–30, 242.

132

2007 GAO Report, supra note 15, at 6.

133

See Chandler, supra note 127, at 242. Note that recovery for plaintiffs must come
from negligence or strict liability unless a brand new tort cause of action is created. See
id. at 230. Data loss plaintiffs usually lack any contractual privity with data handlers,
leaving the plaintiffs without contract law remedies. See id. at 248–50. Additionally,
because the United States treats data as property of the data collector, not the data
subject, the subject has no remedies in property law. See id. As to statutory causes of
action, no statute yet gives a private cause of action for recovering the costs of reasonably
prudent measures taken in response to data loss.

134

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. e (1979) (commenting that it may
not be unreasonable for someone to refuse to undergo medical procedures to avoid loss);
STEIN, supra note 69 § 18:4.

135

See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987).
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remedial measures are reasonably necessary include the likelihood of
future harm, whether a plaintiff (or her data) has been exposed, how much
of the risk of future harm comes from the exposure instead of from other
sources, and the cost-effectiveness of remedial measures.136 Courts
denying credit monitoring have implicitly recognized these factors in
cases where plaintiffs failed to show that credit monitoring was reasonably
necessary.137
[37] Although data monitoring, like medical monitoring, may impose a
heavy burden on defendants, data monitoring is essentially a lossprevention measure. If monitoring is effective, the defendant pays less for
the monitoring then it would have paid to compensate future loss.138

136

See discussion, infra note 137.

137

See, e.g., Melancon v. La. Office of Student Fin. Assistance, 567 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877
(E.D. La. 2008) (finding no cognizable losses from lost backup tapes where no evidence
was offered that any data on those tapes was accessed); Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing,
LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712–13 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (rejecting claims by a plaintiff who
sought the cost of credit monitoring after hard drives were stolen, but could not show that
the data on those hard drives was the target of theft, and where there was no evidence that
any unauthorized person was able to access the data on those drives); Forbes v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021, 1021 n.3 (D. Minn. 2006) (rejecting
credit monitoring damages based on a stolen laptop computer because the plaintiffs had
not shown a present or “reasonably certain” future injury or any intent to misuse their lost
information); Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036, at *4
(D. N.J. July 31, 2006) (rejecting a claim for credit monitoring after a printout containing
the plaintiff’s social security number was lost in the mail). In each of these cases, there
was no evidence that a third party had accessed the lost data. Lost laptop and lost media
cases in particular seem doomed to failure. But see Ponder v. Pfizer, Inc., 522 F. Supp.
2d 793 (M.D. La. 2007). In Ponder, there was evidence that personal information of
17,000 current and former Pfizer employees was actually accessed and downloaded off of
an employee’s laptop computer. Id. at 794. The court still rejected the claim for credit
monitoring because that data had not been misused and because there had been no
physical injury. Id. at 796–98.
138

See Johnson, supra note 102, at 29. If data handlers would save money by paying for
paying for monitoring costs instead of waiting and paying for latent harms, why would
they ever avoid paying for monitoring? Presumably, one does not have to resort to legal
remedies to persuade companies to save money. Indeed, companies are already paying
for a limited amount of monitoring in the form of free credit monitoring to data breach
victims. See 2007 GAO Report, supra note 15 at 35. But there are reasons an
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Furthermore, the burden of data monitoring on the defendant is limited
because the class of potential data monitoring plaintiffs consists only of
those whose data was mishandled.139 For example, if an intruder were to
access a company’s database of one thousand customers, only those one
thousand customers could have claims. A data handler could therefore
prospectively limit its exposure to litigation not only by handling data
carefully, but also by limiting the number of people about whom it collects
data.140 The burden on data handlers could be further reduced by requiring
plaintiffs to allege actual disclosure to a third party (as opposed to mere
loss) and by requiring proof that the remedial measures are reasonably
necessary.141
[38] Claim preclusion is an issue for both data loss claims and medical
monitoring claims, requiring potential plaintiffs to choose whether to seek
immediate recovery for remedial measures or wait and preserve a claim
for a later loss.142 Although the choice would be difficult, it is at least a
choice the data loss victim otherwise would not have had. One author has
suggested making this tradeoff explicit by limiting the liability of breached
organizations to the cost of reasonably necessary steps to prevent identity

organization might not voluntarily pay for extended monitoring, even when it would save
money. Organizations cannot predict the future, so do not know when present
monitoring would be less expensive than latent harms. They might also prefer to risk
possible future lawsuits rather than make definite payments in the present—especially if
those potential lawsuits are far enough in the future that plaintiffs would have trouble
proving causation. See Chandler, supra note 127, at 235–38 (discussing the difficulties
plaintiffs face in proving causation in data fraud cases).
139

See Chandler, supra note 127, at 242.

140

See id.

141

Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 Fed. Appx. 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2007);
see Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987).; Johnson, supra note 102,
at 29.

142

See Chandler, supra note 127, at 238–44.
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fraud.143 But such a liability cap would only make sense if these measures
were actually effective.
IV. CRITERIA FOR AWARDING NON-MEDICAL MONITORING DAMAGES
A. AWARDING DAMAGES BASED ON REASONABLE NECESSITY
[39] Even though the analogy between medical monitoring and data
monitoring is flawed, non-medical monitoring may still be justified in
certain cases. Adapting the criteria used in medical monitoring cases to
non-medical situations gives a similar test.144 A plaintiff should be
allowed recovery when (1) there is a precipitating event, (2) that event
resulted from the defendant’s negligence, (3) the event increased the
plaintiff’s risk of future harm, (4) there exist preventive remedial
measures, and (5) those measures are reasonably necessary.145
[40] This model relies on standard negligence theory. It does not create
a new cause of action, but instead recognizes reasonably necessary costs
as a measure of negligence damages and, therefore, requires proof for all
standard elements of negligence, including cause-in-fact and proximate
cause.146 The model also requires that the plaintiff not only have a risk of
future harm, but an increased risk, and that the increase have been caused
by the breach.147
143

See Johnson, supra note 102, at 29–30.

144

See discussion supra Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes.

145

Cf. Schwartz, supra note 83, at 356–57. Put in data breach terms, this would require
that (1) the plaintiff’s data was exposed in a breach; (2) the defendant negligently caused
that breach; (3) the data breach created an increased risk that the plaintiff will suffer
future fraud or other harm; (4) a way exists to reduce or eliminate that risk, and (5) the
defendant’s negligence made those measures reasonably necessary. See discussion supra
Part II.B.1 and accompanying notes.
146

See Chandler, supra note 127, at 235–45 (discussing how courts have historically
found against plaintiffs in data loss cases because of a failure to show actual harm or
causation).

147

See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
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[41] The central feature of this model is that it allows recovery for
remedial measures that are reasonably necessary. This reflects the
approach followed in Ayers, which allowed costs reasonably incurred by
the plaintiff as legitimate measures of harm stemming from a defendant’s
actions.148 The model also recognizes that under the doctrine of avoidable
consequences, plaintiffs are expected to take reasonably necessary
remedial measures.149
[42] But when are remedial measures reasonably necessary? One
approach would be to apply the same reasonable person standard that is
usually employed in determining what is objectively “reasonable.”150 This
is the approach of the avoidable consequences doctrine, and a first and
necessary step to keep the model in conformity with existing tests.151 But
a test for the reasonable necessity of remedial measures should go beyond
a mere reasonable-person inquiry. Certain situations may increase
confidence that data monitoring costs are reasonably necessary.152 For
example, remedial measures may be more likely to be reasonably
necessary when the plaintiff’s data was actually exposed to a third-party,
creating an increased risk that the plaintiff will suffer future fraud.
Remedial measures might also be considered more likely to be necessary
when those measures are cost-effective in the aggregate—i.e., when the
expected total costs of the breach when remedial measures are used are
much lower than the expected costs without remedial measures.153

148

See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987).

149

See discussion infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes.

150

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (“[t]he factors determining
whether an injured person has used care to avert the consequences of a tort are in general
the same as those that determine whether a person has been guilty of negligent conduct”).

151

See id.; STEIN, supra note 69, § 18:1.

152

See STEIN, supra note 69, § 18:1.

153

See discussion supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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[43] A federal district court in New York suggested some possible
minimum criteria for establishing “exposure” of data.154 Trying to apply
New York law in an area where New York had not yet spoken, the court
held that New York would likely require a plaintiff to show a
“demonstrable basis for a serious concern over misuse” of data on a lost
laptop.155 The court listed several factors that might be used to show such
a basis: (1) lack of password protection, (2) intent and ability by the laptop
thief to access the data, or (3) actual misuse of information that was on the
hard drive.156
[44] The reasonable necessity model is consistent with cases that have
both allowed157 and rejected medical monitoring claims.158 In Stollenwerk,
for example, the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim because she had not

154

See Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281–82
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).

155

Id.

156

Id. The misused information would not have to be the plaintiff’s information; concern
over misuse could also be established by showing that someone else’s data from the same
stolen hard drive had been misused. See id.

157

See Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (noting that it would be
inequitable to force someone wrongfully exposed to toxic chemicals “to have to pay his
own expenses when medical intervention is clearly reasonable and necessary.”).
158

One of the exceptions seems to be the result of confusion on the part of the court. See
generally Giordano v. Wachovia Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036 (D. N.J.
July 31, 2006). The court in Giordano rejected an analogy between credit monitoring
and medical monitoring because the latter requires an actual exposure to a toxin, not a
mere potential exposure. Id. at *3 n.4. It held that because the plaintiff had merely
alleged potential identity fraud, not actual fraud, she had not shown “exposure.” Id. This
analysis misinterprets the analogy. Identity theft was the future harm that credit
monitoring was meant to prevent. Asking the plaintiff to show actual fraud before
seeking credit monitoring is like asking someone exposed to asbestos to prove that she
has cancer before allowing her to seek the cost of tests to detect cancer. A more
appropriate analysis would have required the plaintiff to show that the data breach
actually exposed her data to a third party.
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shown that credit monitoring was reasonably necessary.159 The model’s
requirement that a plaintiff show data exposure also fits several cases that
refused to allow credit monitoring for lack of data misuse.160 Of course,
not all courts would follow the model, especially those that require present
physical harm for medical monitoring claims or those that do not allow
negligence recovery for economic harms. But for those courts willing to
look to non-physical forms of negligence harm, the reasonable necessity
model fits.
B. STANDING AND THE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
[45] The doctrine of avoidable consequences provides another reason to
allow recovery of the costs of reasonably necessary remedial measures.
The doctrine holds that a tort plaintiff may not recover damages for any
harm she could reasonably have avoided.161 This doctrine, however, may

159

Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 F. Appx 664, 666–67 (9th Cir. 2007).
The court held that the plaintiff had made “no showing that a normally prudent person in
these circumstances” would have obtained “premium credit monitoring,” and that the
plaintiff’s expert testimony was “entirely too conclusory to establish that a reasonable
person faced with Stollenwerk’s level of risk of identity theft would incur significant
monitoring costs.” Id. (emphasis added).
160

See, e.g., Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281–
82 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting a claim for credit monitoring where the plaintiff could not
show that there was a “rational basis” to believe that data on a stolen laptop would be
misused); Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710–11 (S.D. Ohio
2007) (rejecting credit monitoring where there was no evidence that information from a
stolen hard drive had been accessed by unauthorized individuals or that it would be used
for unlawful purposes if accessed); see also discussion supra note 137.

161

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1979). The standard of behavior for
the avoidable consequences doctrine is the same as for negligence: reasonable behavior
under all the circumstances. Id. § 918 cmt. c; see also STEIN, supra note 69 § 18:4. The
plaintiff is not required to calculate all the probabilities nor is he “bound at his or her
peril to know the best thing to do.” Id. § 18:1. But the likelihood that remedial measures
will be successful is a factor in considering whether a plaintiff is expected to take
remedial measures. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. e.
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conflict with the constitutional requirement of standing.162 The tension
arises when inexpensive remedial measures may prevent large, unlikely
losses. For example, suppose one could spend $100 to avoid a one percent
chance of losing $1,000,000. Spending the $100 would be rational. The
expected loss from a one percent chance of losing $1,000,000 is
$10,000—one hundred times the cost of avoiding the loss.163 But a court
may say that a one-percent probability of loss is too unlikely to establish
standing, regardless of the amount of potential loss.
[46] In monitoring cases, the doctrines of avoidable consequences and
standing have conflicting goals. The doctrine of avoidable consequences
reflects the importance of taking reasonable measures to avoid loss; the
amount of potential loss figures into the reasonableness analysis.164 But
standing is meant to bar speculative claims–it depends on how likely a loss
is, not the potential size of the loss.165 The result in cases with a small
probability of a large loss is that the plaintiff is left without recovery. The
avoidable consequences doctrine prevents a plaintiff from recovering the
million-dollar loss that could reasonably have been mitigated, but lack of
standing bars any claims for the mitigation.166

162

See Ayers, 525 A.2d at 310–11 (noting that under the avoidable consequences rule, a
plaintiff “is required to submit to treatment that is medically advisable; failure to do so
may bar future recovery for a condition he could thereby have alleviated or avoided.”);
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (discussing the
required showings to establish standing).
163

People make reasonable decisions that do not necessarily match this simple example
of a rational choice, so a reasonable person might not actually make this choice
depending on that person’s preferences, risk tolerance, and other factors. See generally
Bruce Chapman, The Rational and The Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and
Adjudication, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (1994).
164

See STEIN, supra note 69 § 18:1 (noting that the doctrine of avoidable consequences is
applied based on what is “reasonable under all of the circumstances.”).

165

See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (reiterating that constitutional standing requires an injury
that is likely, not speculative).

166

See Chapman, supra note 163, 88–89; STEIN, supra note 69, § 18:1.
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[47] The key to resolving this conflict lies in understanding the harm in
monitoring cases. Many courts that have found a lack of standing have
focused on the likelihood of eventual loss–the one percent probability.167
But when remedial measures are reasonably necessary, the harm is the
necessity of expenses the plaintiff would not otherwise have incurred, not
whatever future injury would have resulted had the measures not been
taken.168 A reasonable-necessity standard recognizes standing to seek
compensation for those plaintiffs that have taken the remedial measures
the doctrine of avoidable consequences expects.169
C. COST ANALYSIS OF REMEDIAL MEASURES FOR LATENT HARM
[48] Recovery for post-breach remedial measures is likely to be
reasonably necessary only if the measures save money—if recovery for
these measures would be less expensive than waiting for the latent harm to
mature.170 One way to determine this is by comparing the estimated
expected costs of a data breach with and without remedial measures. If
the expected cost of a data breach with remedial measures is significantly
lower than the expected cost without them, those measures could be
considered reasonably necessary. Conversely, if the expected costs do not
significantly decline when remedial measures are taken, it is unlikely that
those measures would be found to be reasonably necessary.171

167

See discussion supra note 28 and accompanying text.

168

In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (“the appropriate
inquiry is not whether it is reasonably probable that plaintiffs will suffer harm in the
future, but rather whether medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease.”).
169

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. b (1979) (noting that when a
plaintiff has failed to make substantial efforts to avert the consequences of a tort,
damages are reduced to the amount of the expense that plaintiff should have taken).
170

See id. § 918 cmt. h.

171

Note that this simple comparison does not account for the cost to the system of
litigating claims. Litigation would probably increase or become more complex with the
field of potential plaintiffs opened to those who incurred reasonably necessary
monitoring expenses. For remedial measures to be reasonably necessary, their cost
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[49] The expected cost of latent harm without remedial measures for an
individual victim is determined by the increase in probability of loss
attributable to the event multiplied by the amount of that victim’s loss.172
Assuming a uniform probability of loss,173 the total expected cost of a
latent harm for all victims is equal to the product of (a) the increase in
probability of loss attributable to the event, (b) the average loss, and (c)
the number of victims affected.174
[50] The expected cost with remedial measures is slightly more
complicated than the expected cost without them. In addition to the cost
of the measures themselves, the calculation must include the cost of latent
harms that still occur despite the remedial measures, independent of
whether or not the plaintiffs can recover these latent harms.175 The
calculation must also include the risk that the remedial measures might do
harm of their own. Thus, the expected cost of remedial measures is the
sum of (a) the cost of the measures themselves, (b) the cost of residual
latent harm, and (c) the risk of additional harm from the remedial
measures themselves.
therefore should be significantly lower than the cost without them—i.e., anything near a
break-even comparison should default to disallowing the remedial measures.
172

See Philippe Mongin, Expected Utility Theory, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
METHODOLOGY 171 (John B. Davis, D. Wade Hands & Uskali Mäki ed., Edward Elgar
Publishing 1998).
173

A uniform probability of loss would mean that each breach victim has the same
probability of latent harm as each other victim.
174

The appropriate calculation is the expected cost for all victims because this more fully
reflects the societal costs of a breach as well as the potential cost to a breached
organization.
175

When remedial measures are not one hundred percent effective at preventing the latent
harm, some of that latent harm happens anyway. For example, assume a remedial
measure successfully reduces the eventual loss by fifty percent. The total expected cost
is the cost of providing remedial measures to all the victims, plus the fifty percent
residual latent harm. To put this into numbers, suppose the cost of remedial measures is
$100 per victim, the latent harm is $10,000 per victim, and the remedial measures are
50% effective with no harmful side effects. The expected cost per victim is $100 +
0.50($10,000) = $5100.

34

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 1

V. APPLYING THE REASONABLE NECESSITY MODEL TO
DATA BREACHES
[51] As previously discussed, remedial measures are cost-effective
when the aggregate expected loss with remedial measures is substantially
lower than the aggregate expected loss without those measures.176 The
expected loss from identity fraud resulting from a data breach depends on
three variables: the cost of identity fraud, the cost and effectiveness of
measures designed to prevent or mitigate identity fraud, and the
probability that a data breach will lead to identity fraud.177 The remainder
of this article uses available information on data breach and identity fraud
to estimate whether data monitoring options are cost-effective and, thus,
potentially reasonably necessary.178
A. COST OF IDENTITY FRAUD
[52] How much does identity fraud cost? It is a simple question with a
complex answer. The total cost of identity fraud depends on the answers
to other questions. Does “cost” include time and effort spent responding
to a fraud, or only financial loss? Is the measure of “cost” the out-ofpocket expense to the identity fraud victim, the value of goods stolen, or
overall systematic cost? The cost of identity fraud also depends on the
type of fraud. The harms, and therefore, the costs, differ depending on

176

See discussion supra Part IV.C.

177

See id.

178

As discussed more fully below, much of the available data is contradictory or of
suspect quality. In some cases the only redeeming feature is that the data is (probably)
better than nothing. All is not lost, however. Evaluating the viability of data monitoring
damages only requires determining whether the expected cost of a breach with remedial
measures is substantially greater than the expected cost without them. If the inequality is
so substantial that any margin of error in the data is irrelevant, that is still a useful result.
Precision only matters if the inequality is close—which would not clearly establish the
substantial economic benefit required to show reasonable necessity. In short, even with
faulty data, any result other than one that overwhelmingly shows cost-effectiveness
argues against allowing data monitoring claims.
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whether the fraud is on a new account, existing account, or is nonfinancial.
[53] Experts generally distinguish between three forms of identity
fraud: new account fraud, existing account fraud, and non-financial
fraud.179 New account fraud happens when someone uses a victim’s
personal information to create a new account, such as a loan, in the
victim’s name.180 Existing account fraud occurs when one of a victim’s
accounts, such as a credit card or checking account, is used without
authorization.181 Non-financial fraud can result from other uses of
someone’s identity, such as medical identity fraud, where someone gives
false information to get medical care; criminal identity fraud, where a
suspect or arrestee impersonates someone else; or employment identity

179

See, e.g., SYNOVATE, FED. TRADE COMM’N: 2006 IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT
12
(2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf
[hereinafter 2006 FTC Survey]; Schreft, supra note 12, at 7; Towle, supra note 12, at
242–47.

180

See, e.g., 2007 GAO Report, supra note 15, at 2.

181

See id. Some sources refer to this as “account takeover” or “account hijacking.” See,
e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., PUTTING AN END TO ACCOUNT-HIJACKING IDENTITY
THEFT 4–6 (2004), www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/idtheftstudy/identity_theft.pdf. A
few experts further distinguish between credit-card fraud and other forms of existing
account fraud. See Katrina Baum, Identity Theft, 2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS
SPECIAL
REPORT,
Nov.
2007,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/it05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 BJS Survey]. Federal
law limits consumer liability for unauthorized credit and debit card use. See 15 U.S.C. §§
1643(a)(1)(B), 1693(g)(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.12(b), 205.6(b) (2009). Visa and
MasterCard have also instituted zero-liability policies, further reducing consumer liability
for credit card fraud. See Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments in the
Credit Card Industry, 17 No. 3 FDIC BANKING REV. 23, 32 n.46 (2005), available at
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2005nov/article2.pdf. These laws and policies
make credit card fraud a very low-cost form of fraud for the consumer, and some studies
therefore distinguish it from other forms of existing-account fraud.
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fraud, where the perpetrator uses someone else’s identity to gain
employment.182
[54] Several studies have attempted to measure identity fraud costs.183
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began collecting consumer identity
fraud complaints in 1999,184 and has published reports on its data since
2000.185 It also commissioned surveys in 2003186 and 2007.187 The Bureau
of Justice Statistics of the Department of Justice (BJS) has also surveyed
identity fraud victims.188 Non-government surveys include those by the

182

See Jim Collins, Identity Theft: The Pros and Cons of Identity Scoring vs. Credit
Monitoring,
YOUNG
MONEY,
July
8,
2008,
http://www.youngmoney.com/credit_reports/281.
183

See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT COMPLAINT
DATA, JAN.–DEC. 2007 (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/fraud.pdf [hereinafter
2008 FTC Complaint Data]; IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., IDENTITY THEFT: THE
AFTERMATH
2007
(2008),
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/uploads/1/Aftermath_2007_20080529v2_1.pdf
[hereinafter 2007 ITRC Survey]; JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2009 IDENTITY
FRAUD
SURVEY
REPORT:
CONSUMER
VERSION
(2009),
http://www.idsafety.net/901.R_IdentityFraudSurveyConsumerReport.pdf
[hereinafter
2009 Javelin Survey]; 2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181; CTR. FOR IDENTITY MGMT. &
INFO. PROT., IDENTITY FRAUD TRENDS AND PATTERNS: BUILDING A DATA-BASED
FOUNDATION
FOR
PROACTIVE
ENFORCEMENT
(2007),
http://www.utica.edu/academic/institutes/ecil/publications/media/cimip_id_theft_study_o
ct22_noon.pdf [hereinafter 2007 CIMIP Report]; 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179.
184

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF THE IDENTITY THEFT PROGRAM (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/timelinereport.pdf.
185

See
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N,
NATIONAL
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/reference-desk/national-data.html
visited Oct. 5, 2009).

186

See generally 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179.

187

See id.

188

See generally 2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181.
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Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC)189 and Javelin Strategy &
Research.190
[55] These studies vary widely in their methodologies.191
Unsurprisingly, they also vary widely in their results. The Javelin and

189

See 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183.

190

See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183; JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH,
SYNDICATED REPORT BROCHURE, 2009 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT: IDENTITY
FRAUD ON THE RISE, BUT COSTS PLUMMET AS PROTECTIONS INCREASE (2009),
http://www.javelinstrategy.com/uploads/901.R_IdentityFraudSurveyBrochure.pdf;
see
also BBBOnline.org, New Research Shows Identity Fraud Growth is Contained and
Consumers
Have
More
Control
than
they
Think,
http://www.bbbonline.org/IDtheft/safetyQuiz.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). Javelin’s
optimism might be related to the fact that it is also consults for the financial services
industry. See Eve Mitchell, ID Theft Poses a Bigger Risk Offline, PITTS. POST-GAZETTE,
June 10, 2008, at A6, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/08162/88866028.stm;
Javelin
Strategy
&
Research,
Clients,
http://www.javelinstrategy.com/about/portfolio (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
191

The 2006 FTC survey used random-digit-dialing phone interviews of 4917 people.
2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 3. Its statistics were based on the 559 people who
reported “discovering the misuse of their personal information” since 2001. Id. at 17 n.4.
The ITRC, by contrast, e-mailed its survey to 1031 identity fraud victims who had
contacted the ITRC in the previous year. 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, at 36. It
received responses from 117 victims. Id. The ITRC claims a fourteen percent “response
rate,” based on the 817 people who it believed actually received a survey after 214 emails were returned as undeliverable. Id. This is more accurately termed a cooperation
rate. See Am. Ass’n for Public Opinion Research, Standard Definitions: Final
Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for Surveys (2008),
http://www.aapor.org/content/NavigationMenu/ResourcesforResearchers/StandardDefinit
ions/Standard_Definitions_07_08_Final.pdf. Note that the respondents in the ITRC
survey self-selected twice: once in contacting the ITRC in the first place, and again in
choosing to respond to the survey. See 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, at 36. The
Javelin study also used phone surveys, contacting 4,784 respondents, 482 of whom said
they were identity fraud victims. 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 18. The FTC’s
consumer complaint data was based on actual self-reported and unverified consumer
complaints, not a survey. 2008 FTC Complaint Data, supra note 183, at 2. The BJS
included identity fraud questions as a supplement to its National Crime Victimization
Survey, which is conducted by the Census Bureau and surveys about 76,000 people. See
2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 6; Michael Rand & Shannan Catalano, Criminal
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ITRC surveys both reported measures of average192 out-of-pocket193
losses.194 Javelin’s survey found that fraud victims lost “almost $500”
over all forms of identity fraud.195 The ITRC reported average losses of
$550 per victim for existing-account frauds and $1865 for new-account
frauds.196 All four surveys also reported total-loss197 figures: $1620
(BJS),198 $1882 (FTC),199 $5555 (Javelin),200 and $48,941.11 (ITRC)201 per
Victimization, 2006, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, December 2007, at 7,
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cv06.pdf.
192

Although median values more accurately represent the typical identity fraud victim’s
experience, average (mean) values are more relevant to the calculation of aggregate
expected losses because of the relationship between averages and totals. But they are also
more easily influenced by small numbers of outlier responses.

193

Out-of-pocket losses include only unreimbursed expenses incurred by identity fraud
victims. Goods and services that are stolen but which that the identity theft victim does
not eventually pay for would not be included in out-of- pocket losses.
194

See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 5, 20; 2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183,
at 3.

195

2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 5.

196

2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, at 17. The $1865 figure for new-account fraud
was based on the responses of only forty-five people; ITRC did not reveal the number of
people whose responses formed the basis of the $550 figure for existing accounts. Id.;
see also discussion supra note 191 (noting the methodological flaws with the ITRC
Survey).
197

Total losses include the total value of goods and services stolen, not only victims’ outof-pocket expenses.

198

2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 5. This number reflects a survey question that
asked for the total dollar amount obtained (“[w]hat was the total dollar amount of the
credit, loans, cash, services, and anything else the person obtained while misusing (the
credit card account(s)/any existing accounts other than credit cards/personal information
or new account(s))?”). Id. at 7.
199

2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 8. The FTC survey also reported detailed
median and percentile data broken down by identity fraud type (identifying as new
account, existing account, and credit-card only), but only reported overall means. Id. at
5–8. The survey reported median out-of-pocket costs of $0 for existing-account fraud,
and $40 for new account fraud. Id. at 5.
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victim. The BJS survey further categorized total losses by type of fraud,
reporting averages of $4850 for new-account frauds, $980 for existingcredit-card frauds, and $1220 for other existing-account frauds.202
[56] The surveys also varied widely in the amounts reportedly lost by
victims. A survey of cases handled by the U.S. Secret Service reported
actual loss figures that ranged from no loss in thirty-four cases to a
thirteen-million dollar loss in one case.203 The same survey reported that
eighteen percent of defendants ordered to pay restitution were required to
pay more than $100,000.204 These numbers show how a few very high-

200

See JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2008 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT:
CONSUMER
VERSION
4
(2008),
www.idsafety.net/803.R_2008%20Identity%20Fraud%20Survey%20Report_Consumer
%20Version.pdf. The publicly available version of Javelin’s 2008 survey did not report
an average, but said that 8.1 million people were victimized by identity fraud for a total
of $45 billion, equivalent to a $5555.00 average per-person loss. Note, however, that this
is a per-person estimate, not a per-incident estimate, and does not factor in the possibility
that the 8.1 million person figure includes each member of families (i.e., so that a family
of four suffering one fraud incident would count as four people, not one incident). See id.
201

2007 ITRC Survey, supra note 183, at 18. This number reflects a $48,941.11 cost to
businesses (survey respondents were asked “to total the charges on the fraudulent
accounts in their name . . . based on how much money victims were billed by creditors,
banks, and collection agencies, as well as other related costs”). Id. Note, however, that
this number is based on the responses of only forty-eight people, and does not exclude six
outliers who reported between $100,000 and $700,000 in total losses. Id.; see also
discussion supra note 191 on the ITRC survey’s methodological flaws.

202

2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 5. The BJS survey categorized frauds as
involving the “unauthorized use or attempted use of existing credit cards,” “other existing
accounts,” or “personal information.” Id. Because misuse of personal information is
most closely associated with new-account fraud, the BJS results for “personal
information” are included with new-account fraud data in this note. See id.

203

2007 CIMIP Report, supra note 183, at 26–27.

204

Id. at 25.
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value cases skew the overall averages.205 The averages should, therefore,
be considered very rough figures at best.
[57] What, then, is the cost of identity fraud? The answer is somewhere
between “it depends” and “answer hazy, ask again later.” Even within a
particular type of fraud and measure of loss, different surveys—some with
significant methodological flaws—give widely different results. For the
purposes of analyzing data monitoring cost effectiveness, the best that can
be done is to work with the numbers that are available while recognizing
their problems.
B. PROBABILITY THAT A DATA BREACH WILL LEAD TO
IDENTITY FRAUD
[58] If the cost of identity fraud is a complicated question, the
probability that a data breach will lead to identity fraud is downright
inscrutable. No study measures this probability.206 A rudimentary
calculation of the probability that a data breach will lead to identity fraud
could be done by dividing (a) the number of identity fraud cases caused by
data breach by (b) the total number of fraud-enabling records exposed in
data breaches.207 A proper calculation is not that simple, but even that
level of estimation is difficult to do because the necessary data is flawed.208

205

This does not imply that an arithmetic mean is the wrong measure for evaluating cost
effectiveness of remedial measures. Aggregate cost savings depends on reducing total
amount of losses, not on reducing losses for the most people. But these numbers do show
how a few very costly fraud cases can dramatically shift an average.
206

Estimates have been done for the rate of credit card misuse, but not for identity fraud
more broadly. See, e.g., Thomas M. Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, Much Ado About
Notification, REGULATION, Spring 2006, at 44, 47.

207

“Fraud-enabling” records would be records that contain data that can be used to
perpetrate identity fraud.
208

One complication involves time frames. What time period of data breaches and what
time period of identity fraud cases should one compare? Data breaches release data that
may be used years later for fraud, so simply comparing a year’s worth of data breaches to
the same year’s number of identity frauds compares unrelated numbers. Data breaches
are also reported according the year the breach was discovered, but a few breaches occur
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[59] Part of the problem is that the different parts of the calculation are
tracked using different units of measure, making direct comparison
difficult. Identity fraud figures count people or households, but data
breach statistics are tracked by number of records.209 The number of
records compromised in a data breach may not be the same as the number
of people involved. For example, although a record may be a customer, it
could also be a transaction or a credit card entry. Even if each record is a
person, a database could have multiple entries for the same person.210
Finally, some people may have been affected by multiple breaches; simply
adding all records in all breach events would count these people multiple
times.
[60] Another problem is data incompleteness. Many organizations have
carefully studied the causes, sources, and amount of identity fraud,211 but
data breach numbers are far less certain. Most breach numbers are known
only because state data breach notification laws require organizations to

over a long time before they are discovered. For example, hackers were able to steal
credit card numbers from TJX over a seventeen-month period. See Mark Jewell, Security
Breach at TJX Believed to be Biggest Ever, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 22, 2007, at
1E. The forty five million records affected are usually all counted for 2007, the year the
problem was discovered. See, e.g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data
Breaches, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2009) (including TJX in the list of 2007 data breaches). A year-by-year comparison also
assumes that compromised data is either used for fraud or discarded at about the same
rate as breached data becomes available. But another possibility exists: that breached
data is accumulated in bulk then used over a period of time, like a windfall profit spent
gradually. Such a pattern would require knowing not just the amount of compromised
fraud-enabling data and the number of identity fraud over a seventeen-month period. Cf.
Jewell, supra. This is not an easy problem.
209

See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 208. The Open Security Foundation
maintains a database of announced data breaches, which includes the number of records
affected by a breach—but that does not include unannounced breaches. See Open
Security Foundation, http://opensecurityfoundation.org (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
210

These duplications can result from address changes, name changes, or different
spellings, for example.
211

See, e.g., 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179.
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notify consumers when their data may have been compromised.212 But not
all states have these laws and not all of these laws require telling a law
enforcement agency or the general public about a breach.213 Some data
breaches affect an unknown number of records, and therefore are not
counted in breach totals.214 Any count of lost data breach records,
therefore, only includes the number of known cases.215 The number of
known data breaches—nearly 400 million records since 2000—is only a
part of the total number of records affected.216
[61] Because of these issues, certain assumptions must be made when
estimating the probability that a breach will lead to identity fraud. As
mentioned above, data breach statistics measure records, not people, and
understate the total number of records affected. Nevertheless, the
following calculations use these statistics and assume that the
underestimations and overestimations in these numbers cancel each other

212

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (West 2008).

213

See Jospeh Pereira, Jennifer Levitz, & Jeremy Singer-Vine, Some Stores Quiet Over
Card Breach, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008, at B1 (reporting that four of the chains named
as breach victims in FBI indictments of credit card thieves had never told their customers
about the breaches); David L. Silverman, Data Security Breaches: The State of
Notification Laws, 19 No. 7 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 5, 6 (2007) (noting that “a few”
of the many state breach laws require reporting all breaches to state agencies).
214

See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 208 (“[f]or many of the breaches listed,
the number of records is unknown.”).

215

Undetected breaches also go uncounted in this total. No one knows how many
undetected breaches there are, but they do happen. The TJX breach, for example,
operated for at least seventeen months before the company noticed. Jewell, supra note
208, at 1E. The breach at Heartland Payment Systems was also undetected for a few
months. See Eric Dash & Brad Stone, Big Breach in Card Data Raises Risk for Millions,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at B4 (reporting that data thieves installed data-capturing
software in May, but that that the breach was not discovered until late fall).
216

See OSF Data Loss Database, http://datalossdb.org/download (last visited Oct. 5,
2009) [hereinafter OSF Database] (arranging breaches by date and adding the total
number of breaches from 2000 through 2008).
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out, or at least result in an overall underestimate.217 The calculations also
compare annualized data for years since 2005 when data is available.218
This comparison assumes that breached data is used as it is obtained219 and
assumes a constant probability that breached data will be used for identity
fraud (i.e., that this probability has not been increasing or decreasing over
time).
[62] Under these assumptions, the basic calculations are
straightforward. The first component is the number of records affected by
data breach per year. According to the Open Security Foundation (OSF)
data breach database, organizations announced breaches of about 354
million data records from 2005 through 2008—an average of roughly 88.5
million records per year.220
Approximately 83.5 million records
221
wereaffected in 2008. Thus, it seems reasonable to estimate that about
88 million records are breached per year.222
217

If this number underestimates the real number, it will not change a result that shows
the rate of identity fraud to be too low to justify awarding data monitoring damages
(because a more accurate, higher number would reduce that rate even more).
218

The year 2005 was chosen because that was when most states started to require data
breach notification. Cf. James T. Graves, Note, Minnesota’s PCI Law: A Small Step on
the Path to a Statutory Duty of Data Security Due Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1115, 1118 nn.21–22 (2008).
219

See discussion supra note 208.

220

See OSF Database, supra note 216 (sorting and summing total affected records from
2005 through 2008).
221

OPEN SECURITY FOUNDATION, DATA LOSS DATABASE 2008 YEARLY REPORT,
http://datalossdb.org/yearly_reports/dataloss-2008.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). This
number, however, does not include the Heartland Payment Systems breach, which
compromised an unknown—but possibly huge—number of records. See Dash & Stone,
supra note 215, at B4.

222

By comparison, the Identity Theft Resource Center reported 127.7 million records
exposed in 2007 as well as incidents in 2006 and 2005 affecting “potentially” 19 million
and 64.8 million “individuals,” respectively. IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2007
BREACH
LIST
1
(2008),
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%202007.pdf [hereinafter 2007
ITRC Breach Report]; IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2006 DISCLOSURES OF U.S.
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[63] The other component of the calculation is the number of identity
fraud cases caused by data breach. This is a two-part figure based on the
total number of identity fraud cases multiplied by the percentage of those
cases caused by data breach. About eight to ten million people suffer
identity fraud annually.223 Estimates of the percentage of identity fraud
resulting from company-controlled data range from 12% to 26.5%.224 Data
breach directly counts for about 5% to 11%.225 Thus, the amount of

DATA
INCIDENTS
1
(2007),
http://idtheftmostwanted.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%202006.pdf [hereinafter 2006
ITRC Breach Report]; IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., 2005 DISCLOSURES OF U.S.
DATA
INCIDENTS
1
(2006),
http://idtheftmostwanted.org/ITRC%20Breach%20Report%202005.pdf [hereinafter 2005
ITRC Breach Report]. The ITRC numbers do not include some breaches that could
potentially expose sensitive data but where “no actionable incident has been documented
or disclosed.” Id.
223

See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 5 (noting that “almost 10 million
Americans learned they were victims of identity fraud in 2008”); 2006 FTC Survey,
supra note 179, at 4 (extrapolating survey statistics to show that approximately 8.3
million people suffered identity fraud in 2005).

224

See SASHA ROMANOSKY ET AL., DO DATA BREACH DISCLOSURE LAWS REDUCE
IDENTITY THEFT? 8–9 (2008), http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Romanosky.pdf.
These figures include any forms of data loss where a company arguably had control of
the data, including theft by corrupt business employees, misuse of data from purchase or
other transactions, and direct theft of the information from the company. Id. at 9 n.19;
see also 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 7; 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at
30. The CIMIP study found that in the cases in which the source of data was known,
business-controlled data accounted for half of them. See 2007 CIMIP Report, supra note
183, at 53. That scales to 26.5% of all cases in that survey, when unknown cases are also
included. See id. at 10, 53 (noting that a point of compromise could be determined in 274
out of 517 cases); ROMANOSKY, supra at 8–9.
225

See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 7 (reporting that eleven percent of survey
respondents who knew where misused data came from believed that the data was from a
data breach); 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 30 (where five percent of respondents
said that information used in an identity fraud was obtained through a data breach).
However, most respondents in both surveys did not know how their data was obtained.
See 2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 7 (disclosing that its figures were based on
the thirty five percent of respondents who they knew how their data was obtained, out of
all 482 respondents who reported suffering identity fraud); 2006 FTC Survey, supra note
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identity fraud resulting from data breach might be in the range of 415,000
to 1 million incidents per year.226 A calculation of all identity frauds and
all forms of data breach yields a 0.5% to 1% rough estimate of the rate at
which data breach results in identity fraud.227
[64] But not all types of data breach are the same. As shown in Table
1, the forms of data breach can be categorized by whether they resulted
from an intentional or unintentional act, and whether they likely exposed
data to a third party. Some forms of data breach appear more likely to
lead to data misuse and, thus, to identity fraud. In particular, fraud may be
more likely when data is intentionally exposed. Misplaced backup tapes,
lost laptops and stolen hardware seem less likely to result in data misuse.
Some research supports this intuition. For example, a GAO study of
twenty-four large breaches was able to find data misuse in only four of
those cases, all of which involved hacking or misrepresentation.228

179, at 30 (showing results that fifty six percent of survey respondents didn’t know how
their information was taken).
226

Using the numbers in the 2006 FTC Survey, five percent of 8.3 million breaches
would be 415,000 incidents attributable to data breach. See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note
179, at 4, 30. The Javelin numbers are eleven percent of “nearly” ten million breaches, or
1.1 million incidents, rounded down to one million to allow for the word “nearly.” See
2009 Javelin Survey, supra note 183, at 5, 7.
227

See discussion supra notes 220, 226 and accompanying text (dividing the FTC and
Javelin numbers by the estimated number of records breached from 2005 through 2008).

228

See 2007 GAO Report, supra note 15, at 24, 26.
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Exposed

Data Not
Exposed

Intentional Act
Fraud, Hacking, Social
Engineering, Viruses,
Stolen Documents

Stolen media, backup
tapes, or computer

Volume XVI, Issue 1
Unintentional Act
Accidental disclosure
through mail, Internet,
or e-mail
Lost documents, drives,
computers, or media
Improperly disposed
documents, drives,
computers, or media

Table 1: Forms of Data Breach
[65] Data breach likelihood calculations should consider this. A
plaintiff who seeks monitoring costs following a hacking-related breach
probably has a greater chance of suffering identity fraud than a plaintiff
who sues after a laptop is lost; their claims should not be treated the same.
Likewise, as discussed in Part V.A, not all forms of identity fraud have the
same cost. Existing-account fraud, especially on credit-card accounts,
presents a particularly low risk for the consumer because of laws limiting
liability.229 Therefore, the appropriate calculation might not be the total
amount of identity fraud resulting from all data breaches, but rather, the
rate at which new account fraud results from intentional, data-exposing
breaches such as hacking, social engineering, and fraud.
[66] The more focused calculation increases the probability estimate.
From 2005 through 2008, about 4.8 million Social Security number
records per year were compromised in data breaches that involved
hacking, social engineering or fraud.230 About one in five identity fraud

229

See discussion supra note 181.

230

The OSF database, when filtered to report only totals for Fraud and Hacking events,
shows forty-six million records in 2005, 8.5 million records in 2006, 121 million records
in 2007, and 20.7 million records in 2008, for total of 196.2 million records. See OSF
Database, supra note 216. When those results are further filtered to show only breaches
that disclose Social Security numbers, the type of data most useful in new account fraud,
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cases are new-account frauds.231 If 5% to 11% of those are the result of
data breach,232 then somewhere around 100,000 to 170,000 new account
fraud cases result from fraud and hacking incidents each year.233 Dividing
the 170,000 by 4.8 million gives about one in twenty-eight estimated
chance (or 3.5% probability) that a record in a data breach involving fraud
or hacking of Social Security numbers will be used for new account fraud.
C. COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDIAL MEASURES
[67] Several methods exist to try to mitigate the effects of data loss.
This section discusses some of the more common data loss remediation
measures, their costs, and their effectiveness at avoiding loss.
1. CREDIT MONITORING
[68] Credit monitoring is one of the most common reactions to data
loss. It has become common practice for organizations to offer free credit
monitoring after a breach; the monitoring is usually offered for a limited
period, such as a year or two.234 As discussed in Part II.A, plaintiffs have
also sought—without success—to recover the costs of additional credit
monitoring beyond the free period.
the total number of accounts affected since 2005 drops to 19.2 million. Calculating that
as an annualized number gives 4.8 million per year.
231

See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 4, 12 (showing 0.8% of respondents
claiming new account fraud, representing 22% out of the 3.7% who reported some form
of identity fraud); 2005 BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 1 (showing that 1,083,100, or
16.85%, of the 6,426,200 estimated households that reported any form of identity fraud
reported new account fraud).
232

See discussion supra note 225. Note that this simple calculation ignores the real
possibility that data breaches could be disproportionately responsible for new account
fraud.
233

Using the FTC numbers gives 21.6% of 415,000 = 89,640. See supra notes 226, 231.
Combining the BJS numbers with Javelin’s higher estimate for the number of frauds
resulting from data breach gives 16.85% of 1,000,000 = 168,500. See supra note 231.

234

2007 GAO Report, supra note 15, at 35.
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[69] Offered primarily by the three credit reporting bureaus, credit
monitoring products allow increased access to credit reports. Although
the Fair Credit Reporting Act entitles everyone to one free credit report
per year,235 credit monitoring enables unlimited access to one’s credit
report and, optionally, credit score.236 The services typically alert the
subscriber when credit information changes.237 Credit monitoring often
includes identity theft insurance, which promises to pay for certain costs
of responding to identity fraud.238 Each credit reporting bureau offers
credit monitoring products that monitor only its own credit reports, or, for
a higher price, products that monitor all three credit bureau reports.239
Credit monitoring services that monitor all three bureaus currently cost
about fifteen dollars per month.240

235

15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(A) (2006).

236

See Credit Monitoring, http://www.thecredittruth.org/credit-monitoring.aspx (last
visited Oct. 5, 2009).
237

For example, Equifax lists the following types of notifications customers of its credit
monitoring service could expect to receive: “New accounts opened in your name; credit
inquiries resulting from a company requesting a copy of your credit report; an address
change; bankruptcies and other public records; some changes to current accounts; balance
increase alerts based on a self-selected dollar amount or percentage.” Equifax Credit
Watch FAQs, http://www.equifax.com/cs/Satellite/EFX_Content_C1/1175248697129/51/5-1_Layout.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
238

See Consumer Reports Money Adviser, Costly Credit-Monitoring Services Offer
Limited Fraud Protection, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/money/credit-loan/costlycredit-monitoring-services-offer-limited-fraud-protection-4-07/overview/0704_costlycredit-monitoring-services-offer-limited-fraudprotection_ov.htm?Extkey=SY95PI0&CMP=KNCCROVMYSSP&HBX_OU=51&PK=yssp (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
239

See,
e.g.,
Equifax
3-in-1
Monitoring
With
4
FICO
Scores,
http://www.equifax.com/3in1-monitoring-with-4-fico-scores (last visited Oct. 5, 2009);
Triple Advantage, http://www.experian.com/consumer-products/triple-advantage.html
(last
visited
Oct.
5,
2009);
TrueCredit,
http://www.truecredit.com/3BCM?AID=104475848-PID=19119618-SID=-credit-reportmonitoring-truecredit_review.php--2009-09-21--23-44-05 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).

240

See,
e.g.,
Equifax
3-in-1
Monitoring
With
4
FICO
Scores,
http://www.equifax.com/3in1-monitoring-with-4-fico-scores (last visited Oct. 5, 2009);
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[70] Although popular, credit monitoring products have a number of
problems. They only notify subscribers when something bad has already
happened; this allows quicker response to a fraud, but does not prevent the
fraud.241 Credit monitoring only monitors financial information that
appears on a credit report.242 If data is misused non-financially or in a way
that is not tied to the consumer’s social security number, credit monitoring
will not detect it.243 Credit monitoring, therefore, is useless against illegal
use of a social security number to avoid tax or employment laws, when
given to a law enforcement officer during arrest, or in medical identity
fraud.244 Credit monitoring also cannot detect unauthorized charges on
existing accounts.245 Finally, the insurance included in credit monitoring
products can be less than valuable due to limitations and gaps in
coverage.246
[71] For these reasons, credit monitoring has limited usefulness. As
such, courts have failed to find such monitoring to be reasonably
necessary.

Triple Advantage, http://www.experian.com/consumer-products/triple-advantage.html
(last
visited
Oct.
5,
2009);
TrueCredit,
http://www.truecredit.com/3BCM?AID=104475848-PID=19119618-SID=-credit-reportmonitoring-truecredit_review.php--2009-09-21--23-44-05 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
241

See Kelli B. Grant, 4 Reasons to Forego Credit Monitoring Services, SMARTMONEY,
July 14, 2008, http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/deals/4-reasons-to-forgo-creditmonitoring-services-23454.

242

See Collins, supra note 182; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Straight Talk About
Identity
Theft
Monitoring
Services,
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs33CreditMonitoring.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
243

See Collins, supra note 182; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 242.

244

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 242.

245

Id.

246

See Consumer Reports Money Adviser, supra note 238.
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2. CREDIT FREEZES
[72] The credit freeze is another option for people worried about
identity fraud. A credit freeze blocks all access to a consumer’s credit
report, preventing, rather than merely monitoring, new account fraud as
long as the freeze is active.247 A credit freeze prevents fraudulent new
accounts in the consumer’s name because the seller of services cannot
check the consumer’s credit report.248 Freezing credit reports first became
an option with the passage of several state laws; the credit reporting
bureaus responded with plans to announce nationwide credit freeze
availability.249
[73] Although laws in forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
allow consumers to freeze their credit reports,250 the laws differ on how

247

See Security Freeze, http://www.experian.com/consumer/security_freeze.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2009).
248

See Eve Mitchell, Putting Freeze on Identity Theft, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Cal.), Nov.
12, 2007.

249

Jane J. Kim, More People Are Freezing Credit Reports; Fearful of ID Theft;
Consumers Block Access to Their Records; A Quick Thaw, Made Easier, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 24, 2007, at D1.
250

See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.010–.995 (Westlaw 2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441698 (Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 4-112-101 to 4-112-113 (Supp. 2007); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1785.11.2 (West Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-106.6
(West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36a-701 to 36a-701a (Supp. 2008); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2201–2203 (Supp. 2006); 2007-3 D.C. Code Adv. Leg. Serv. 33–39
(LexisNexis); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.005 (West Supp. 2008); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1913 to -915 (Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489P-3 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 28-52-101 to -109 (Supp. 2008); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2MM
(West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-5-24-1 to -18 (West Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 714G.1–.11 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50702(j), 50-723, 50-724 (Supp. 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.365 (LexisNexis 2008);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3571.1(H)(5), 9:3571(M)–(Y) (Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit., 10 §§ 1312(10-C), 1313-C to –E (Supp. 2007); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §
14-1212.1 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93 §§ 50, 56(b), 62A
(West Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. §§ 13C.016–.019 (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24201 to -217 (Supp. 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1726 to -1736 (2007); NEB. REV.
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much the consumer must pay to freeze or unfreeze the report.251 Most
laws allow identity fraud victims to freeze or unfreeze their credit reports
for free.252 Depending on the jurisdiction, consumers who are not victims
of identity fraud may have to pay to place a freeze,253 remove a freeze,254

STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2601 to -2615 (Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 598C.105,
598C.300–.390 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-B:22 to :26
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-11-46 to -50 (West Supp. 2008); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56-3A-01 to -06 (West Supp. 2008); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-t
(McKinney Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-63 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
51-33-01 to -14 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.52 (West, Westlaw through 2008
File 129); OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 149–159 (West 2008); ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
646A.606–.618, 646A.624 (West Supp. 2008); 73 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2501–2510 (West
2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-48-1 to -7 (Supp. 2008); Financial Identity Fraud and
Identity Theft Protection Act, 2008 S.C. Act 190 (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§
37-20-110(16), 37-20-160); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 54-15-1 to -16 (Supp. 2008); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-2101 to -2110 (Supp. 2008); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§
20.034–.04 (Vernon Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-45-101 to -401 (Supp. 2008);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2480h (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-444.1 to -444.2 (Supp.
2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.170 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46A6L-101 to -105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.54 (West Supp. 2008);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-12-501 to -509 (2007).
251

Letter from Jeannine Kenney & Gail Hillebrand, Senior Policy Analyst & Senior
Attorney, Consumers Union, to Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 25, 2008), at 5,
available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/FTC-Comments-Security-Freeze.pdf.
252

See CHRISTOPHER WOLF, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY § 5:5.5[B][11] (2009) (Tanya L.
Forsheit & Kristen J. Mathews eds. 2009) (2006).
253

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2203(b)(13) (2009) (allowing a twenty dollar charge
for a consumer’s initial credit freeze, after which all freeze-related activity must be free);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2607 to -2609 (Supp. 2008) (allowing a $3 fee to place a
freeze, with free removal or temporary lifting of the freeze); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1444.2 (Supp. 2008) (allowing a ten dollar fee to place a freeze, but no fee for removal or
temporary lifting).

254

See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-106.6(12)(c) (West Supp. 2008) (allowing
a ten dollar fee to remove a freeze, but no fee to place the freeze); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §
380-t (n)(2) (McKinney Supp. 2008) (allowing a five dollar fee to remove or temporarily
lift a freeze, but no fee to place the first freeze).
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both,255 or neither.256 Consumers in some states may also temporarily
freeze their credit reports for less than the cost of placing and then lifting a
freeze.257
[74] Credit freezes are no panacea, but they are more effective than
credit monitoring.258 As with credit monitoring, credit freezes cannot
prevent existing account fraud or forms of identity fraud that do not
require credit.259 Credit freezes can also be more of a hassle than credit
monitoring. Unlike the all-in-one credit monitoring services, a credit
freeze must be placed separately with each reporting bureau.260 Placing or
lifting a freeze takes time, so consumers with frozen credit cannot get
“instant credit” or other loans unless they plan ahead by lifting the

255

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1698(K) (Supp. 2008) (allowing a five dollar
fee to place, remove, or temporarily lift a freeze); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.11.2(m) (West
Supp. 2008) (allowing credit bureaus to charge a ten dollar fee to place or remove a
freeze); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-914(p) (Supp. 2008) (allowing a three dollar fee to place,
remove, or temporarily lift a freeze); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2108(l) (Supp. 2008)
(allowing a $7.50 fee to place a freeze, a five dollar fee to remove the freeze, and no fee
to temporarily lift a freeze).
256

See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-24-14 (West Supp. 2008); Financial Identity Fraud
and Identity Theft Protection Act, 2008 S.C. Act 190, sec. 2, § 37-120-160(J), available
at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess117_2007-2008/bills/453.htm.
257

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.11.2(m) (West Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 36a-701a(i) (Supp. 2008) (allowing a ten dollar fee to temporarily lift a credit
freeze).
258

See, e.g., Manny Vetti, Credit Freeze Or Credit Monitoring? Best Ways to Fight
Identity Theft, http://ezinearticles.com/?Credit-Freeze-Or-Credit-Monitoring?--BestWays-to-Fight-Identity-Theft&id=1389620 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
259

Cf. Mitchell, supra note 248 (noting that “access to a consumer’s credit reports and
credit scores cannot be shared” unless specific permission is given) (emphasis added).

260

Claire Moore, Security Freeze or Fraud Alert, Aug. 30, 2009,
http://www.examiner.com/x-6044-Financial-Literacy-Examiner~y2009m8d30-Securityfreeze-or-fraud-alert (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
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freeze.261 The reporting bureaus also make the credit freeze process
relatively difficult, often forcing the consumer to “jump through hoops” to
freeze their credit files.262
[75] Security freezes are also cheaper than credit monitoring. Even in
states where placing and lifting a credit freeze is the most expensive, a
consumer can place and temporarily lift a credit freeze several times for
the cost of three-bureau credit monitoring.263 Perhaps the low cost of
placing credit freezes explains why plaintiffs do not seek damages
resulting from the cost of placing credit freezes.264
3. FRAUD ALERTS
[76] Fraud alerts are another possible response to data loss. The Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of 2003 included
provisions enabling fraud alerts.265 A fraud alert is a statement in a credit
261

Business advocacy groups have been quick to cite this barrier to instant credit as one
of the problems with credit freeze laws. See, e.g., Minn. Senate, Commerce Committee
Update,
Apr.
3,
2006,
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/committee/20052006/commerce/update.htm (reporting Minnesota Business Association comments that a
proposed credit freeze law could cause problems with instant credit).
262

See Marni Ginther, Icy Start for Credit Freeze, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 23,
2006, at 1A.
263

The states in which credit freezes are most expensive allow credit bureaus to charge
ten dollars per bureau for placing or removing a freeze, and twelve dollars to temporarily
lift a freeze. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 714G.5 (West 2008). For the $180 annual price of
three-bureau credit monitoring, a consumer in these states could place a freeze then
temporarily lift it four times per year. Most states are cheaper. For example, residents of
Minnesota, which caps credit freeze fees at five dollars, could place a credit freeze and
temporarily lift it at all three bureaus ten times per year for the same price as a creditmonitoring service. See MINN. STAT. § 13C.016, subdiv. 8 (2008). See also supra note
240 and accompanying text.
264

Security freezes may also be underutilized by fraud victims. According to the 2006
FTC identity theft survey, only seven percent of victims of identity fraud froze their
credit reports. 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 48.

265

15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(a)(1) (2006).
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file that tells anyone looking at it that “the consumer may be a victim of
fraud.”266 An initial fraud alert, which can be activated by anyone who
“asserts in good faith a suspicion that the consumer has been or is about to
become a victim of fraud or related crime,”267 lasts for ninety days.268 An
extended fraud alert lasts for seven years,269 but is only available to
consumers who have suffered identity fraud.270 Prospective creditors who
receive a credit report tagged with an initial fraud alert must use
“reasonable policies and procedures” to “form a reasonable belief” that the
request is authorized.271 If the credit report is tagged with an extended
alert, then the prospective creditor must contact the consumer in person or
by phone to confirm her application.272
[77] The greatest weakness in this system, from the victim’s
perspective, is that a fraud alert is only available for ninety days, unless
the victim has already suffered fraud.273 A few enterprising souls have
attempted to fix this problem with businesses that repeatedly place initial
fraud alerts on a consumer’s credit record, essentially creating a
continuous fraud alert for as long as the consumer pays for the service.274
266

Id. § 1681a(q)(2).

267

Id. § 1681c-1(a)(1).

268

Id. § 1681c-1(a)(1)(A). The consumer may request that the fraud alert be removed
before the ninety-day period. Id.

269

Id. § 1681c-1(b)(1)(A). The consumer can also request an early end to an extended
fraud alert.
270

Id. § 1681c-1(b)(1).

271

Id. § 1681c-2(h)(1)(B). An open-end credit plan may be extended without this check.

Id.
272

Id. § 1681c-2(h)(2)(B). Open-end credit plans are not subject to this requirement,
either. Id.
273

See discussion supra note 230 and accompanying text.

274

See Ron Lieber, Outspoken Champion of Identity Protection Tussles With Skeptics,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2008, at C1 (discussing LifeLock).
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The most notorious of these services, LifeLock, has drawn legal trouble
from its customers,275 the state of Oklahoma,276 and Experian.277
[78] Fraud alerts also share a problem with credit monitoring and credit
freezes. Fraud alerts do no protect against non-financial forms of fraud
and cannot prevent unauthorized charges to existing accounts.278 But
unlike credit monitoring and credit freezes, fraud alerts are free.279 Despite
that advantage, few identity fraud victims have used fraud alerts.280
D. PUTTING THE NUMBERS TOGETHER
[79]

The available data shows that:
•

The average overall cost of new account fraud is anywhere
from $1620 to $49,941 per victim.281

275

Associated Press, Lifelock Customers Sue Owners, Cry Fraud, May 23, 2008,
available at http://www2.journalnow.com/content/2008/may/23/lifelock-customers-sueowner-cry-fraud/business-nationworld.
276

Lieber, supra note 274. Oklahoma claims that LifeLock is selling insurance without a
license through its one million dollar guarantee. Id.
277

Id.

278

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO BUY OR NOT TO BUY: IDENTITY THEFT SPAWNS NEW
PRODUCTS
AND
SERVICES
TO
HELP
MINIMIZE
RISK
1–2
(2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/idtheft/idt05.pdf.
279

See § 1681c-1(a)(1), 1681c-1(b)(1) (requiring initial and extended fraud alerts to be
placed “upon . . . request”).
280

See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 46–48 (showing that only fourteen percent
of victims placed an initial ninety-day fraud alert with a credit agency, and only seven
percent placed seven-year extended alerts).
281

See discussion supra Part V.A.
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•

The largest estimated probability that an intentional data breach
involving a Social Security Number will lead to new-account
identity fraud is roughly one in twenty-eight, or 3.5%.282

•

Available means of reducing new account identity fraud have
mixed effectiveness.283

[80] Most plaintiffs have sought credit monitoring as their form of
relief.284 The cheapest three-bureau credit monitoring service costs $180
per year.285 To buy just five years of credit monitoring beyond the one or
two years most organizations offer for free after a breach, a data breach
victim would have to pay $900.286 Suppose, for the sake of argument, that
(1) credit monitoring is one hundred percent effective at preventing new
account fraud; (2) that the ITRC is right about the cost of new account
identity fraud being nearly $50,000; and (3) that the one in twenty-eight
chance of a hack leading to new-account identity fraud is in the ballpark of
accurate.287
282

See discussion supra Part V.B.

283

See discussion supra Part V.C.

284

See discussion supra Part II.A.

285

See Triple Advantage, supra note 239.

286

The five-year example period was chosen as a potentially reasonable time period for
credit monitoring. Data monitoring plaintiffs’ complaints have not specified how long
they thought credit monitoring should last. See, e.g., First Amended Class Action
Complaint and Jury Demand at 13, Kahle v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P., 486 F. Supp. 2d
705 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (No. 1:05CV756), 2006 WL 430509 (seeking an order requiring
the defendant to “establish a credit monitoring program”); Complaint at 11, Hendricks v.
DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 1:05-cv00767), 2005 WL 3518203 (seeking “[d]amages sufficient to pay for the monitoring of
credit reports and accounts”); Complaint and Jury Demand at 15, Giordano v. Wachovia
Secs., L.L.C., No. 06-476, 2006 WL 2177036 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006) (No. AT2-L-356705), 2005 WL 4255487 (seeking an order requiring the defendant to “establish a credit
monitoring program”).

287

This clearly is not the case, but it is the simplest way to proceed, and makes little
difference in the final result.
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[81] Based on these suppositions, the expected cost of a breach would
be $1770 per person. Five years of credit monitoring costs a little over
half as much as the expected cost of the breach.288 To economically justify
allowing data monitoring costs, the aggregate cost savings should be
significant enough to overcome any doubt that the cost savings are real
and outweigh other drawbacks. This hypothetical illustrates that there is
no such savings with post-breach credit monitoring.
[82] The hypothetical uses numbers that were as favorable to
maximizing the expected value of loss as reasonably possible. For
example, the total amount of breached data was probably an
underestimate.289 The total cost of new-account identity fraud, $50,000,
was an order of magnitude higher than other estimates of these costs.290
The credit monitoring cost was calculated using the least expensive
service available. The calculation also assumed that credit monitoring
completely prevents identity fraud. Yet, even with these favorable
numbers, the cost factors still do not support recovery for credit
monitoring costs after a data breach.291 Given available data, it
isimpossible to construct a calculation favoring recovery that does not
strain credulity.292

288

See discussion supra Part V.C.1.

289

See discussion supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text.

290

See discussion supra notes 198–201 and accompanying text.

291

Note again that these costs are based on averages and aggregates. Some individual
data breach victims will suffer identity fraud that will cost them tens of thousands of
dollars. The FTC’s data suggests that at least ten percent of identity fraud victims will
lose more than ten thousand dollars. See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note 179, at 5. But
these individual cases do not make for an overall aggregate economic benefit in allowing
medical monitoring costs.

292

The most favorable calculation possible would assume that: (1) the average cost of
new-account identity fraud is $50,000; (2) credit monitoring is 100% effective at
eliminating the risk of identity fraud; and (3) all or most of the unknown causes of
identity fraud in the FTC and Javelin surveys are data breaches, and fifty-six percent of
annual identity frauds are the result of data breaches. See 2006 FTC Survey, supra note
179, at 30. In that case, the probability that a data breach involving fraud or hacking of
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VI. CONCLUSION
[83] The courts that have rejected post-breach credit monitoring claims
are right, but for the wrong reasons. Recovery for monitoring after data
breach should be denied, not because data breach is insufficiently like
exposure to toxins, but because plaintiffs have not shown that these
measures are reasonably necessary. The relationship between the cost of
monitoring, the potential cost of identity fraud, and the likelihood that data
breach will lead to identity fraud suggests that it is currently only slightly
more expensive, at worst, to wait for identity fraud than to pay for
monitoring up-front. But this could change over time, especially for
intentional forms of data compromise. Instead of dismissing these claims
for insufficient similarity to medical claims, courts should evaluate them
based on whether the remedial measures are reasonably necessary,
weighing such factors as cost effectiveness of those measures and placing
the burden on the plaintiff to show reasonable necessity.

Social Security numbers will lead to new-account fraud would be 23.3% (5.6 million
identity frauds x .20 ratio of new-account frauds to total identity frauds)/4.8 million fraud
or hacking data breaches that involve Social Security numbers). With all those stars
aligned, the expected cost of a data breach would be $11,666, but the assumptions needed
to get to that number stretch too far. If the cost of new-account identity fraud is closer to
the $4850 the BJS survey found, the expected cost of a breach drops to $1130—only
$230 more than the cost of five years of the lowest-price credit monitoring. See 2005
BJS Survey, supra note 181, at 5.
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